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Foreigners to the United States are usually struck by the harshness of its 
conflicts between justice and the mass media. The O.J. Simpson trial, in particu-
lar, is frequently cited as a clear illustration of the difficulty of harmonizing a 
strong commitment to freedom of the press and principles of fair trial in a time 
of “saturation coverage.”1 In the same vein, distinguished U.S. scholars, discuss-
ing the Duke lacrosse case,2 have argued that trial by media is a phenomenon 
“as American as the apple pie.”3 
If it is undeniable that the tension between a sensationalist, commercially 
motivated press and fair-trial rights in the United States has reached a degree 
unmatched in the rest of the world,4 it would be naïve to look at this matter and 
the problems involved as only American legal curiosities. A simple glance at the 
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 1. See G. Stuart Adam, The Thicket of Rules North of the Border, in COVERING THE COURTS: 
FREE PRESS, FAIR TRIALS & JOURNALISTIC PERFORMANCE 25 (Robert Giles & Robert W. Snyder 
eds., 1999); John M. Rosen, Free Press vs. Fair Trial: Could OJ Happen in Canada?, 4 SW. J. L. & 
TRADE AM. 5, 5 (1997); Joanne Armstrong Brandwood, Note, You Say “Fair Trial” and I Say “Free 
Press”: British and American Approaches to Protecting Defendants’ Rights in High Profile Trials, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1412, 1413 n.5, 1430–31 (2000). 
 2. See generally STUART TAYLOR, JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL 
CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE (2007) (detail-
ing the story of the case and the frenzy that surrounded it); Susan Hanley Kosse, Race, Riches & Re-
porters: Do Race and Class Impact Media Rape Narratives? An Analysis of the Duke Lacrosse Case, 31 
S. ILL. U. L.J. 243 (2007) (examining “media narratives from the recent high profile Duke case, [and] 
comparing them to media narratives of previous rape cases to ascertain whether race and class are 
changing these narratives”). 
 3. Hodding Carter III, Opening Address at Duke University School of Law Symposium Confer-
ence The Court of Public Opinion: The Practice and Ethics of Trying Cases in the Media (Sept. 28–29, 
2007) (Webcast available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/?match=Court+of+Public+ 
Opinion). 
 4. See Gavin Phillipson, Trial by Media: The Betrayal of the First Amendment’s Purpose, 71 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 15–16 (Autumn 2008). For a good description of the clash between the phe-
nomenon of “saturation coverage” and fair-trials principles in the United States, see generally Mark J. 
Geragos, The Thirteenth Juror: Media Coverage of Supersized Trials, 39 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1167, 
1171 (2006). 
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most recent books and international symposia on this topic shows that similar 
questions are discussed in almost every jurisdiction and cannot be automatically 
linked to the peculiar framework of the American legal process.5 
Obviously, a precise set of institutional factors may explain the great social 
relevance of the “trial by media” in the United States. Among the more-
important factors are the almost limitless discretion and political role of the 
state prosecutor (whose perverse linkage to intense media coverage of alleged 
crimes became immediately apparent in the Duke lacrosse case),6 the jury trial,7 
the strict rules of evidence,8 and the “absolutist” view of the First Amendment.9 
Significant as they are, these factors cannot be taken by themselves as de-
terminative of the conflicts implied in the relationships between the mass media 
and the judicial process. Indeed, comparable questions have also arisen in coun-
tries like Germany and France with nonadversarial (or at least less adversarial) 
models of criminal procedure.10 In contrast to most jurisdictions in the United 
States, the prosecutor in those countries is a civil servant appointed and not 
elected,11 and the mixed-bench system replaces the all-lay jury.12 
 
 5. See, e.g., Colloquium, Le public: un partenaire? Les relations entre les médias et la Justice, 
EUROPÄISCHES FORUM FÜR ANGEWANDTE KRIMINALPOLITIK (2006), available at 
http://www.europaforum-kriminalpolitik.net/franz/html/fr_tagung.htm (F.R.G.); Colloquium, Judiciary 
and the Media, EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY (2006), available at 
http://www.csm.it/ENCJ/pdf/RelazioneFinaleJudiciaryAndTheMedia-IT.pdf; Symposium, Justice and 
the Media, Cracow, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2005), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dg1/ 
legalcooperation/judicialprofessions/ccje/meetings/Conferences/default_en.asp. 
 6. See Abby L. Dennis, Reining in the Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial Oversight and the Superse-
der of Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 132–33 (2007). On prosecutorial discretion in the United States, see 
Gerard E. Lynch, Prosecution: Prosecutorial Discretion, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 
1246–47 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002). 
 7. See Uli Widmaier, Jury und Medien—Zu einem elementaren verfassungsrechtlichen Problem in 
den USA, 57 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 407, 407–08 (2004) (F.R.G.); see also 
RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 110–12 (2003). 
 8. Some categories of evidence—inadmissible at trial—are often disclosed by the media, with a 
resulting risk of prejudicing proceedings. See Michael Chesterman, Contempt: In the Common Law, But 
Not the Civil Law, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 521, 540–41 (1997). On the relationships between common-
law rules on evidence and trial by jury, see MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 7–57 
(1997). 
 9. See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-
021 (Feb. 2005), at 17, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=668543 (describing how other coun-
tries have refused to expand freedom of expression laws to match those of the United States). See gen-
erally Paul D. Carrington, Our Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1167 (2001); Robert A. 
Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the Rest of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 377 (2006). 
 10. The dichotomy between inquisitorial and accusatorial systems of criminal justice relies on sim-
ple “ideal-types,” rarely present in their pure form, but nonetheless useful for the sake of model-
building. See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 3–6 (1986); Thomas Weigend, Criminal Proce-
dure: Comparative Aspects, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 444, 446. On 
the gradual convergence between the two approaches, see also Gaëtan Di Marino, L’implantation et les 
remises en cause des dogmes accusatoire et inquisitoire (Introductory Report of the Colloquium, Inquisi-
toire-Accusatoire: un écroulement des dogmes en procédure pénale?), 68 REV. INT’L DROIT PÉN. 17, 25–
30 (1997)(Fr.). 
 11. For a comparative overview, see Joachim Herrmann, The Role of the Prosecutor or Procurator: 
Synthesis Report, 63 REV. INT’L. DROIT PÉN. 533, 539–40 (1992) (Fr.); Barbara Huber, The Office of 
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Criminal trials are under the spotlight for many reasons.13 Media scrutiny of 
criminal proceedings is everywhere considered essential to democracy and, as 
the renowned Dreyfus affair taught, it fosters effective safeguards against mis-
carriages of justice.14 Interest in crime news is generally high and attracts public 
curiosity, especially if prominent persons, sex, and mystery are involved.15 Yet a 
criminal trial, with all its rituals, taboos, and symbols,16 easily turns into a spec-
tacle, which has entertainment value and therefore gives newspapers and 
broadcasters strong commercial incentives to cover it.17 
Its entertainment value aside, the problem of court-related speech is more 
general and far reaching. As has been carefully explained by system theorists, it 
has to be looked upon as a general problem of dialogic interaction between dif-
ferent systems of communication—the law and the media—with which every 
open society has to deal.18 A comparative perspective is therefore needed in or-
 
the State Prosecutor in Europe: An Overview, 63 REV. INT’L. DROIT PÉN. 557, 562–68 (1997); with spe-
cific reference to Germany, see Mirjan R. Damaška, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal 
Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 503–04 (1975); Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal 
Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 317, 320 (1995). 
 12. Under the mixed-bench system, followed by many European jurisdictions, lay assessors sit 
alongside professional judges and jointly decide guilt and the level of punishment. For a comparative 
overview, see Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Principles of German Criminal Procedure in Comparison with 
American Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 239, 243 (1970); Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Proce-
dure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 361, 366 (1977). In Continental Europe, 
only major crimes are tried by a mixed bench; by contrast, lesser indictable offenses, which represent 
the great majority of cases, are decided by professional judges sitting alone in court. See Thomas Wei-
gend, Criminal Procedure: Comparative Aspects, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra 
note 6, at 444, 446. 
 13. Media interference with the judicial process is by no means limited to the reporting of criminal 
cases; it may affect other areas of law as well. See Winfried Hassemer, Vorverurteilung durch die 
Medien?, 38 NJW 1921, 1925 (1985) (F.R.G.). One of the most important decisions on freedom of 
speech by the European Court of Human Rights, Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, arose out of the 
publication of an article focusing on the civil litigation resulting from the thalidomide tragedy. App. No. 
6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245 (1979), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/ 
viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=165&sessionId
=14267936&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. 
 14. The Dreyfus case represents one of the best examples of the beneficial function of media scru-
tiny on the administration of justice. See Vincenzo Marinelli, Structure et fonctions de la présomption 
d’innocence, in LA PRÉSOMPTION D’INNOCENCE EN DROIT COMPARÉ 47, 53 (Centre Français de droit 
comparé ed., 1998). In that case, the aggressive press campaigns, and in particular the pieces written by 
Émile Zola, contributed to prevent the perpetuation of a patent injustice. See ROBERT MICHAELIS, 
RECHTSPFLEGE UND POLITIK IN DER AFFÄRE DREYFUS 1, 11 (1965). See generally PATRICE 
BOUSSEL, L’AFFAIRE DREYFUS ET LA PRESSE (1960). 
 15. See Robert Reiner, Sonia Livingstone & Jessica Allen, From Law and Order to Lynch Mobs: 
Crime News Since the Second World War, in CRIMINAL VISIONS: MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF 
CRIME AND JUSTICE 13, 13 (Paul Mason ed., 2003) (“Deviance is the quintessential element of news-
worthiness.”). 
 16. For insightful descriptions of trial rituals, see FRANCO CORDERO, RITI E SAPIENZA DEL 
DIRITTO 310–672 (1981). See also ANTOINE GARAPON, DEL GIUDICARE: SAGGIO SUL RITUALE 
GIUDIZIARIO 7–169 (2007) (translating BIEN JUGER: ESSAI SUR LE RITUEL JUDICIAIRE into Italian) 
(Italy). 
 17. See Bill Loges & Sandra Ball-Rokeach, Mass Media and Crime, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME 
AND JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 988, 989. 
 18. See Richard Nobles & David Schiff, A Story of Miscarriage: Law in the Media, 31 J.L. & SOC’Y 
221, 222 (2004) (applying to the issue of media-justice interference the analytical tools developed by 
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der to better evaluate regulatory options available to any legal system, the ac-
tual set of values protected or sacrificed by different national policies, and the 
feasibility of law reforms. This article will offer some insights on the issue of 
court-related speech restraints from the point of view of comparative law. 
Part II below will provide a general analytical framework, isolating and dis-
cussing three basic models of regulation. I will argue that the leading conceptual 
dichotomy of “free press versus fair trial,” as a product of thinking in terms of 
the English and U.S. models, is culturally biased and reflects the typical com-
mon-law perception of the interests at stake in the relationship between justice 
and the media. Part III will focus on some selected Continental European ex-
periences, usually disregarded by the mainstream literature on the subject. The 
principle techniques employed for restricting media freedom to cover judicial 
proceedings will be analyzed to show that protecting an impartial administra-
tion of justice should not be the only rationale for interferences with freedom of 
expression. 
It should be made clear from the outset that this article will not deal exten-
sively with all the questions raised by media interference with pending proceed-
ings. The focus will be on speech restraints during the pretrial stage. Other is-
sues pertaining to the main hearing or the post-trial phase, such as trial 
broadcasting or the clash between freedom of the press and the resocialization 
interest of the defendant (droit à l’oubli), will be set aside, although they are 
important for any comparative analyses of the relationship between justice and 
the media. 
II 
JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA: A COMPARATIVE-LAW PERSPECTIVE 
A. General Framework 
It is not uncommon to approach the topic of justice and the media from a 
comparative perspective. Criminological research makes extensive use of com-
parative analyses to investigate mass-media depictions of crime and to assess 
the impact of media accounts, descriptions, and explanations on social behav-
ior.19 The regulation of media freedom to report and cover judicial proceedings 
 
NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE REALITÄT DER MASSENMEDIEN 17–28 (1995)); see also Winfried Hassemer, Il 
diritto attraverso i media: messa in scena della realtà?, 9 ARS INTERPRETANDI 147, 159–61 (2004) (It-
aly). 
 19. See, e.g., MARIA KAFATOU-HAEUSERMANN, THE MEDIA–CRIME NEXUS REVISITED: ON 
THE RE-CONSTRUCTION OF CRIME AND LAW-AND-ORDER IN CRIME-APPEAL PROGRAMMING 173 
(2007) (discussing the results of empirical analyses about the features and effects of crime TV programs 
in various European countries). See also the essays collected in IMAGES OF CRIME II: 
REPRESENTATIONS OF CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL IN POLITICS, SOCIETY, THE MEDIA AND THE 
ARTS (Hans Jörg Albrecht ed., 2004). 
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has also been the subject of several inquiries using the functional methodology 
of comparative law.20 
Model building is one of the critical issues of comparative research. In the 
mainstream (Anglo American) literature, two principal models have framed the 
discussion on the topic of court-related speech restraints.21 
1. Protecting Speech: The U.S. Approach 
The first model is based upon the idea that the free press and the unim-
peded administration of justice are not per se conflicting ideals, but are rather 
mutually supportive.22 Legal reporting, in particular, is highly valued since it in-
creases public confidence in the law and enhances deterrence of deviant behav-
iors. Moreover, it is beneficial to democracy because it provides an external 
 
 20. Among the most significant works, see ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 312 (2005) (con-
trasting how England’s media “may be liable for contempt of court” for publishing criminal defendants’ 
previous convictions, with the U.S. media’s First Amendment “entitle[ment]” to publish such informa-
tion); JOACHIM BORNKAMM, PRESSEFREIHEIT UND FAIRNEß DES STRAFVERFAHRENS: DIE 
GRENZEN DER BERICHTERSTATTUNG ÜBER SCHWEBENDE STRAFVERFAHREN IM ENGLISCHEN, 
AMERIKANISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN RECHT (1980) (comparing English, U.S., and German 
approaches to the free press–fair trial issue); YVONNE BRAUN, MEDIENBERICHTERSTATTUNG ÜBER 
STRAFVERFAHREN IM DEUTSCHEN UND ENGLISCHEN RECHT (1998) (analyzing the English and 
German experiences); IAN CRAM, A VIRTUE LESS CLOISTERED: COURTS, SPEECH AND 
CONSTITUTIONS (2002) (citing cases from around the world, and comparing approaches); BAREND 
VAN NIEKERK, THE CLOISTERED VIRTUE; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (1987) (containing case-study analyses from different European 
jurisdictions); Marcel Lemonde, Justice and the Media, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 688 
(Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., 2002); John R. Spencer, Le rôle des médias dans les 
procédures judiciaires: approche comparative, in LA PRÉSOMPTION D’INNOCENCE EN DROIT COMPARÉ, 
supra note 14, at 83 (comparing English and Continental approaches to court-related speech regula-
tion); Michael Chesterman, OJ and the Dingo: How Media Publicity for Criminal Jury Trials is Dealt 
with in Australia and America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 109 (1997) (comparing the two systems from the per-
spective of an Australian lawyer); Stephen J. Krause, Punishing the Press: Using Contempt of Court to 
Secure the Right to a Fair Trial, 76 B.U. L. REV. 537 (1996) (“[T]he United States should enact a statute 
similar to the [British] Contempt of Court Act of 1981 . . . .”). See also Tammy Joe Evans, Fair Trials vs. 
Free Speech: Canadian Publication Bans Versus the United States Media, 2 SW. U. J. L. & TRADE AM. 
203 (1995) (comparing Canadian and U.S. approaches to free speech and their interactions); Sally 
Walker, Freedom of Speech and Contempt of Court: The English and Australian Approaches Com-
pared, 40 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 583, 583 (1991); Joachim Scherer, Justiz und Massemedien: Kontrollier-
ende oder kontrollierte Medienöffentlichkeit?, 39 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES 
RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 38, 42–70 (1979) (comparing Anglo American and German approaches); 
Jacob S. Ziegel, Some Aspects of the Law of Contempt of Court in Canada, England and the United 
States, 6 MCGILL L.J. 229 (1959) (comparing how the contempt power operates in different jurisdic-
tions). 
 21. In particular, see CRAM, supra note 20, at 77, 78 (outlining both the “scrutiny of government 
model” and the “administration of justice model”). 
 22. For a detailed analysis of this model, see BARENDT, supra note 20, at 322–23; Chesterman, su-
pra note 20, at 124; Alfredo Garcia, Clash of the Titans: The Difficult Reconciliation of a Fair Trial and 
a Free Press in Modern American Society, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1107, 1109–33 (1992); Brandwood, 
supra note 1, at 1415. On the gradual dismissal of contempt of court, see Krause, supra note 20, at 552–
55; on the problem of gag orders’ admissibility, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Lawyers Have Free Speech 
Rights, Too: Why Gag Orders on Trial Participants Are Almost Always Unconstitutional, 17 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L.J. 311, at 314 (1997); Jonathan Eric Pahl, Note, Court-Ordered Restrictions on Trial Participant 
Speech, 57 DUKE L.J. 1113 (2008); on the issue of media liability for unfair legal reporting, see Note, 
Media Liability for Reporting Suspects’ Identities: A Comparative Analysis, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1043, 
1047 (2007). 
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check on police, prosecutorial, and judicial authorities and guards against mis-
carriages of justice. Therefore, any interference with media freedom to access, 
report, and comment upon ongoing trials is prima facie unlawful. Almost com-
pletely banned are prior restraints, though the court may order limitations on 
the extrajudicial speech of trial participants. If an irresponsible piece of journal-
ism results in prejudice to the proceedings, the legal system does not provide for 
a strong and effective set of sanctions against the parties responsible for the 
wrongdoing. Restrictive contempt-of-court laws are generally considered in-
compatible with the constitutional guarantee of free speech. Even defamation 
law is media friendly, making it difficult for affected parties to recover from 
media organizations for unfair or biased coverage. To sum up, this model grants 
wide immunity to the press and resorts only to procedural devices aimed at neu-
tralizing the effect of prejudicial publicity. Among the most common are voir 
dire, special jury instructions, sequestration, postponement, change of venue, 
and reversal of conviction on appeal. 
The United States typically relies on this model. In an important line of 
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has struck a peculiar balance between the prin-
ciples of free speech and fair trial, attaching great weight—undoubtedly greater 
than in any other Western country—to the former.23 In particular, the legal re-
gime of trial-related reporting in the United States is characterized by the fol-
lowing elements: 
1. virtual absence of deterrent penal sanctions aimed to prevent prejudicial 
publicity, 
2. hostility toward prior restraints on the press, 
3. limited speech restrictions directed toward trial participants (gag orders), 
and 
4. extensive use of procedural techniques aimed at neutralizing the impact of 
prejudicial publicity. 
2. Protecting Justice: The English Approach 
The second model is concerned with the threats posed by the media to an 
unimpeded and impartial administration of justice.24 Fair trials and public confi-
 
 23. Among the more important rulings on the relationship between the First Amendment and fair-
trial rights, see Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (holding prior restraint in a murder 
case was unconstitutional and did not serve the defendant’s rights); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 
(1966) (holding that certain press behavior may be so prejudicial as to interfere with defendants’ due-
process rights); and Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 274 (1941) (reversing contempt of court convictions 
editorials published in local newspapers regarding a pending trial). On the limitation of freedom of 
speech of trial participants, see Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (allowing State 
Bars to regulate lawyers’ public statements that have a “substantial likelihood of material prejudice”). 
On the particular issue of disclosure of rape victims’ identities, see Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 
(1989) (holding for a rape victim whose privacy was invaded unlawfully when a newspaper, violating 
Florida law, published the victims’ names), and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) 
(finding that rape victims’ privacy rights fade when their names appear in the public judicial record). 
 24. See generally ARLIDGE, EADY & SMITH, ON CONTEMPT 63 (David Eady & A.T.H. Smith eds., 
2005); CRAM, supra note 20, at 78; HELEN FENWICK & GAVIN PHILLIPSON, MEDIA FREEDOM UNDER 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 180–97 (2006); CHRISTOPHER J. MILLER, CONTEMPT OF COURT 207 (2000); 
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dence in the courts as the proper forum for settlement of disputes is given 
greater weight than the goals served by an unrestrained freedom of the press. 
As a consequence, the exercise of free speech respecting ongoing proceedings is 
more strictly limited. Instead of resorting only to neutralizing devices, this 
model makes extensive use of penal sanctions—under the doctrine of contempt 
of court—in order to curb disclosure of facts or statements of opinion that 
threaten to prejudice the proceedings. In addition, statutory-based or court-
ordered prior restraints are admitted when necessary to prevent the reporting 
of specific items of prejudicial information. Furthermore, affected parties would 
find it easier to recover under defamation law, and their actions would not be 
automatically trumped by free speech. This model accepts restricting the free 
flow of information in order to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial and 
to safeguard public confidence in the administration of justice. 
This is the traditional common-law approach, followed in England and other 
Commonwealth countries (for example, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). 
Compared to the first model, such a legal regime displays the following fea-
tures: 
1. heavy penal sanctions for the publication of materials that may interfere 
with the due course of justice, 
2. use of prior restraints aimed at preventing publication of specified items 
of information, 
3. use of protective orders directed at trial participants, and 
4. ancillary recourse to procedural devices (such as judicial warnings to ig-
nore prejudicial publicity, change of venue, and jury discharge). 
B. Refining the Model 
The general outline sketched thus far has the advantage of making an ex-
tremely broad and heterogeneous subject matter more easily manageable, 
though it appears to be lacking in at least two respects.  
First, it reflects a static understanding of the law, giving insufficient visibility 
to the processes of change and evolution underway in many legal systems. 
Above all, it takes for granted a radical opposition between the U.S. and the 
other common-law experiences, although this divide, undisputable at its concep-
tual core, is becoming day by day more nuanced and less clear-cut in its opera-
tive applications. The phenomenon of “constitutionalization” of private law and 
of speech claims,25 in particular, has been altering the traditional balance be-
 
Krause, supra note 20, at 539; A.T.H. Smith, Free Press and Fair Trial: Challenges and Change, in 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 123, 127 (Jack Beatson & Yvonne Cripps 
eds., 2000) [hereinafter Smith, Free Press and Fair Trial]; Spencer, Le rôle des médias, supra note 20, at 
86; Walker, supra note 20, at 584; Brandwood, supra note 1, at 1430–35. For the earlier developments, 
see Donald M. Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial in English Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 17, 17–20 
(1965). 
 25. This phenomenon has interested both common-law and civil-law countries. See generally 
HELEN FENWICK & GAVIN PHILLIPSON, supra note 24, at 4–12 (discussing the “constitutionalization of 
areas of media law directly affecting the freedom to broadcast or publish” in English law); DONALD P. 
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tween fair trial and free press. As a consequence, the polarization of the models 
has been watered down, and the noted “isolation” of U.S. law partly mitigated. 
The evolution of Canadian law after the introduction of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms is illustrative. The Dagenais decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, in particular, shows the difficulty in keeping the common-law 
approach to restrictive orders and post-publication sanctions in line with a 
stronger guarantee of free speech.26 “There is no doubt that the decision in 
Dagenais has moved the Canadian law of contempt closer to the position which 
obtains in the United States of America.”27 
Most relevant, from the same point of view, is the experience of the United 
Kingdom. As is well known, the 1950 European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom28 has strongly influenced the evo-
lution of English law in the field of court-related speech.29 The judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Sunday Times v. United Kingdom30 led to 
 
KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 419 
(1997) (providing an overview of the German experience); BASIL S. MARKESINIS & HANNES 
UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 406 (2002); Christian Huff-
mann, Note, Has the Charter Freed the Press? A Comparison of the Effects of United States and Cana-
dian Constitutional Provisions on the Freedom of the Press to Attend and Cover Criminal Trials, in 11 
MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. J. INT’L L. 141, 156 (2002) (providing an analysis of the impact of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 on media freedom to cover criminal trials). 
 26. Before the introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Consti-
tution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, the balance between fair-trial and 
other administration-of-justice concerns, on the one hand, and freedom of the press, on the other, 
showed a clear prevalence accorded to the former. Since the Charter introduced an express guarantee 
of “freedom of the press and other media of communication,” Art. 2b, the Canadian courts started 
gradually to reformulate the traditional sub judice rule, showing a more-tolerant attitude toward trial-
related reporting; this trend was backed up by the landmark ruling of the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 3 S.C.R. 835 (1994), which held that a publication ban could 
be issued only if (1) it is necessary to avoid a serious threat to the fairness of the trial; (2) there are no 
other devices, reasonably available, apt to secure a fair trial; and (3) the means adopted are proportion-
ate to the ends pursued. This ruling was in contrast with the traditional stance adopted by Canadian 
case law. As the majority observed, “[T]he traditional common-law rule governing publication bans—
that there be a real and substantial risk of interference with the right to a fair trial—emphasized the 
right to a fair trial over the free-expression interests of those affected by the ban and, in the context of 
post-Charter Canadian society, does not provide sufficient protection for freedom of expression. When 
two protected rights come into conflict, Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that fully 
respects the importance of both rights. Given that publications bans, by their definition, curtail the 
freedom of expression of third parties, the common-law rule must be adapted so as to require a consid-
eration of both the objectives of a publication ban, and the proportionality of the ban to its effect on 
protected Charter rights.” Id. at 6. For an assessment of the implications of this decision on the regula-
tion of publication bans and sub judice contempt, see CRAM, supra note 20, at 102–04; Ann Riehle, 
Canada’s “Barbie and Ken” Murder Case: The Death Knell of Publication Bans?, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 193, 208–12 (1996). 
 27. MILLER, supra note 24, at 302. 
 28. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
 29. Nigel V. Lowe, The English Law of Contempt of Court and Article 10 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, in THE EFFECT ON ENGLISH DOMESTIC LAW OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND OF RATIFICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 318 (Michael P. Furmston et al. eds., 1983); Smith, Free Press and Fair Trial, supra note 24, at 
123. 
 30. See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245 (1979). 
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the 1981 enactment of the Contempt of Court Act. This statute was intended to 
effect a “permanent shift in the balance of public interest away from the protec-
tion of the administration of justice and in favour of freedom of speech.”31 The 
Act significantly narrowed the scope of application of post-publication sanc-
tions and created a special defense of public interest.32 Since then, domestic 
courts have interpreted and implemented the contempt provisions in a way con-
sistent with the principle of freedom of expression enshrined in Article 10 (1) of 
the Convention.33 
The second critical remark pertains to the narrow range of the jurisdictions 
considered. To single out the systems that should be included in the comparison 
is a critical issue of any model-building process. Far from being a cognitively 
neutral stage, it may significantly affect the general outcomes of the study.34 As 
a matter of fact, most of the works published in English on court-related speech 
focus their attention only on common-law jurisdictions. By contrast, civil-law 
experiences are rarely taken into account and analyzed on a comparative basis.35 
This choice might be defended as consistent with the methodological canon 
of similarity.36 Nonetheless, it has serious shortcomings. In particular, it presents 
the danger of reducing the entire problem of media interference with justice to 
the single issue of trial fairness. This is understandable, since in a common-law 
context inflammatory pretrial publicity is likely to prejudice the proceedings, 
particularly by influencing the potential jurors.37 Therefore, a lawyer called 
 
 31. See Smith, Free Press and Fair Trial, supra note 24, at 123 (citing Lloyd, L.J., in A-G v. News-
paper Publ’n plc., [1988] 1 Ch. 333, 382 D-F (U.K.)). 
 32. Under the common-law doctrine of contempt, it was illegal for the media to prejudge a case in 
any manner, or to publish any material or comment in advance of trial suggesting its possible or favored 
outcome. For this absolute prejudgment rule, see A-G v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1974] A.C. 273, 
(1973) 3 All E.R. 54 (H.L.). After the introduction of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981, c. 49, a publica-
tion that usurps the functions of courts by “prejudging” a case is not considered unlawful per se, but 
only if it “creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seri-
ously impeded or prejudiced.” § 2(2). Furthermore, the media may be held strictly liable for contempt 
of court only if the proceedings are “active,” § 3, and they can take advantage of the newly created spe-
cial defense of public interest. Under § 5 of the Act, “a publication made as or as part of a discussion in 
good faith of public affairs or other matters of general public interest is not to be treated as a contempt 
of court under the strict liability rule if the risk of impediment or prejudice to particular legal proceed-
ings is merely incidental to the proceedings.” § 5. 
 33. On the latest developments, see ARLIDGE, EADY & SMITH, supra note 24, at 51, observing “a 
changing climate in the context of free press versus fair trial.” Significant, from this point of view, is the 
restrictive stance recently taken by the English courts regarding the power to order the postponement 
of publication under § 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act, and the power to grant injunctions to re-
strain contempts. See FENWICK & PHILLIPSON, supra note 24, at 210–23. 
 34. See Gerhard Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 383, 407–11 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
 35. This has been recognized by CRAM, supra note 20, at 183, noting that “few scholars based in 
common law jurisdictions have ventured to consider the regulation of court-related expression under 
civil law systems.” 
 36. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT–HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34–35 
(Tony Weir trans., 1998). 
 37. It is commonly assumed that jurors have a limited ability to withstand prejudicial coverage. For 
literature supporting that assumption, see Edmond Costantini & Joel King, The Partial Juror: Corre-
lates and Causes of Prejudgement, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 9, 36–38 (1981); Christina A. Studebaker & 
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upon to deal with “trial by media,” will be concerned, above all, with avoiding 
the obstacles that the exercise of freedom of speech might present to a fair trial. 
Other legitimate grounds, though, could justify a restriction of the free flow of 
information, even in the absence of any risks to an unimpeded and impartial 
administration of justice, and these tend to be systematically overshadowed by 
the mainstream literature on this topic. 
1. Protecting Personality: The Continental Approach 
If one looks to the other side of the Atlantic, the overall picture is different. 
Not only the solutions, but also attitudes toward the interests at stake in regu-
lating court-related expression significantly differ. The Anglo-American tradi-
tion pays great attention to the clash between free press and fair trials, but it 
tends to underestimate the problem of the implications of biased media cover-
age on a criminal suspect’s personal sphere.38 Continental lawyers, by contrast, 
seem relatively less concerned with the issue of trial fairness than with the need 
for safeguarding the privacy, personal dignity, and presumption of innocence of 
trial participants against interference by the media.39 
This, again, may be easily explained by looking at the underlying institu-
tional framework and at some other cultural and social factors that shape the 
Continental stance. On the one hand, the nonadversarial system of criminal 
 
Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity: The Media, the Law and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 428, 428 (1997). Some recent empirical studies have shown, however, that the actual rate of influ-
ence of media publicity is significantly smaller than expected. See MICHAEL CHESTERMAN, JANET 
CHAN & SHELLEY HAMPTON, MANAGING PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
CRIMINAL JURY TRIALS IN NEW SOUTH WALES 196 (2001) (Austl.). On the other hand, it is a widely 
shared belief that professional judges are less vulnerable to press campaigns and biased media coverage 
of court proceedings. See, e.g., Craxi v. Italy (No. 2), App. No. 34896/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. at [104] (Mar. 5, 
2003), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142 
BF01C1166DEA398649&key=7933&sessionId=14267202&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. It is also 
commonly assumed that trained judges sitting on a mixed bench have the ability to minimize the impact 
of juror bias. See BORNKAMM, supra note 24, at 207. See generally Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay 
Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 136 (1972) (considering “the role of the 
lay judges in the mixed tribunals of the German criminal courts”). 
 38. This is especially true for the American experience. See, e.g., Note, Media Liability for Report-
ing Suspects’ Identities, supra note 22, at 1043. It can generally be assumed, however, that in all com-
mon-law jurisdictions the focus of suspect-reporting regulation is not so much on privacy and dignity, 
but rather on trial fairness. See, e.g., YVONNE BRAUN, MEDIENBERICHTERSTATTUNG ÜBER 
STRAFVERFAHREN IM DEUTSCHEN UND ENGLISCHEN RECHT, supra note 20, at 105. Regarding disclo-
sure of a suspect’s identity, see Roderick Munday, Name Suppression: An Adjunct to the Presumption 
of Innocence and to Mitigation of Sentence, CRIM. L. REV. 680, 682 (1991) (“If English law is normally 
averse to granting anonymity to witnesses (and even to victims of crime) and to forbidding the publica-
tion of their names and personal details, such reluctance has been almost total when it comes to the 
identification of defendants.”); Heleen Scheer, Publicity and the Presumption of Innocence, 52 
CAMBRIDE L.J. 37, 37–42 (1993). The only exception of some relevance is the protection of juvenile 
offenders and victims of sexual offences. See JAMIE CAMERON, LA VIE PRIVÉE DE LA VICTIME ET LE 
PRINCIPE DE LA PUBLICITÉ DES DÉBATS 49 (2003) (Can.); CRAM, supra note 20, at 134–60; JOSEPH 
JACONELLI, OPEN JUSTICE: A CRITIQUE OF THE PUBLIC TRIAL 161, 212 (2002). 
 39. See Claus Roxin, Strafrechtliche und Strafprozessuale Probleme der Vorverurteilung, NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT [NSTZ] 153, 157 (1991) (F.R.G.); Spencer, supra note 20, at 85; 
Scherer, supra note 20, at 70–76 (comparing the Lebach decision of the German Constitutional Court 
and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)). 
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procedure and the smaller lay involvement in the justice process substantially 
reduce the likelihood of prejudice to the proceedings.40 On the other hand, the 
peculiar constitutional vision of privacy as dignity41 and the typical European 
doctrine of state obligations to protect fundamental rights42 tend to shift the fo-
cus of the conflict from the vertical relationships between defendants and the 
courts to the horizontal relationships between defendants and the mass media.43 
This shift is clearly reflected in the changing meaning of the principle of pre-
sumption of innocence, which is no longer regarded as a simple “procedural” 
safeguard internal to criminal proceedings, but also as a “substantial” right to 
be asserted vis-à-vis private parties.44 
Taking into account the Continental European experiences may therefore 
enhance the general understanding of the problems involved in the regulation 
of court-related speech, since it sheds light on a particular dimension of the con-
flict between justice and mass media that is often overlooked. As a first step, 
the taxonomy discussed so far may be usefully enriched by isolating a third 
model of court-related speech regulation.45 The underlying assumption of this 
model is that media coverage of pending trials might be at odds not only with 
the fairness and impartiality of the proceedings, but also with other individual 
and societal interests. In particular, presumption of innocence of the defendant 
and reputation and privacy of trial participants are highly valued. Accordingly, 
freedom of expression may be subjected to various restrictions in order to fur-
ther these interests. Narrowly focused prior restraints are provided for, on ei-
ther a statutory or a judicial basis. Penal post-publication sanctions are fre-
quently employed, especially as general-deterrent devices against the violation 
of the rules on pretrial secrecy. Also increasingly relevant is the role of private-
law remedies, such as injunctive relief, rectification orders, and damages. Some 
 
 40. See, e.g., BORNKAMM, supra note 20, at 207, 217; Chesterman, supra note 8, at 541, 558; Jörg 
Soehring, Presse, Persönlichkeitsrechte und ‘Vorverurteilungen,’ 88 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ 
UND URHEBERRECHT 518, 526 (1986) (F.R.G.). 
 41. See EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY 
AND THE UNITED STATES 41–54 (2002); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: 
Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004). 
 42. See generally Dieter Grimm, The Protective Function of the State, in EUROPEAN AND US 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 119–27 (Georg Nolte, ed. 2005); Heike Krieger, The Protective Function of the 
State in the United States and Europe: A Right to State Protection? Comment, ivi, at 153–164; Mark 
Tushnet, The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 INT’L. J. 
CONST. L. 79, 89 (2003). 
 43. This is a critical point: the European attitude to protect presumption of innocence as against 
private parties and in particular the media, see infra III.E.2, starkly contrasts with the U.S. resistance to 
hold nonstate actors bound to respect fundamental rights, such as fair-trial rights. See Hans A. Linde, 
Fair Trials and Press Freedom—Two Rights against the State, 13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 211, 216–18 (1977). 
 44. See Robert Badinter, La présomption d’innocence, histoire et modernité, in LE DROIT PRIVÉ 
FRANÇAIS À LA FIN DU XXÈ SIÈCLE: ÉTUDES OFFERTES À PIERRE CATALA 133, 145 (2001) (Fr.); An-
toine Buchet, La présomption d’innocence au regard de la convention européenne des droits de l’homme 
et des libertés fondamentales, in LA PRÉSOMPTION D’INNOCENCE EN DROIT COMPARÉ, supra note 14, at 
27. For further discussion of this shift, see infra III.E.2. 
 45. See generally BORNKAMM, supra note 20, at 217, 247; YVONNE BRAUN, 
MEDIENBERICHTERSTATTUNG ÜBER STRAFVERFAHREN IM DEUTSCHEN UND ENGLISCHEN RECHT, 
supra note 20, at 71, 105. 
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neutralizing measures, such as change of venue, are admitted in theory but 
rarely applied in practice. It should be noted that, by preventing the publication 
of information likely to infringe reputational and dignity interests, this model 
enhances the quality of legal reporting and therefore affords an indirect protec-
tion of the interest in trial fairness (differently from the common-law approach, 
in which dignity interests are indirectly guaranteed by the institution of con-
tempt of court). 
III 
COURT-RELATED SPEECH RESTRAINTS IN CONTINENTAL EXPERIENCES 
A. Civilian Equivalents of the Sub Judice Rule 
Under the traditional common-law stance, protection of the proper func-
tioning of the trial process represents one of the most compelling grounds for 
restraining freedom of speech.46 The law of contempt, in particular, prohibits 
publications that are thought likely to interfere with the course of justice in a 
particular case (sub judice rule).47 In the United Kingdom, the Contempt of 
Court Act of 1981 introduced a strict-liability rule with respect to publications 
that create “a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in 
question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced.”48 
The institution of contempt of court is frequently referred to as one of the 
typical features of common-law systems.49 This does not mean, however, that 
conduct punishable as contempt under the sub judice rule is always allowed or 
tolerated in civil-law jurisdictions. Laws concerning pretrial secrecy limit the 
disclosure of specific items of information, which would be also protected—
although under a different rationale—by the law of contempt.50 In addition, 
some legal systems have enacted provisions specifically aimed at preventing 
prejudicial influences on the key actors in trials. 
Interesting examples may be found in both Austria and France. In Austria, 
the problem of prejudicial publicity was dealt with as early as 1862. Article VIII 
of the Strafgesetznovelle of 1862 provided that “whoever, while a criminal pro-
cedure is still pending, publishes in print media statements regarding the value 
of evidence, and the assumed outcome of the proceedings . . . , in a way capable 
 
 46. See, e.g., Trevor R.S. Allan, Common Law Constitutionalism and Freedom of Speech, in 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 17, 31–33 (Jack Beatson & Yvonne 
Cripps eds., 2000). 
 47. Publications may be found to be interfering with the judicial process if they create a risk of se-
riously impairing the court’s impartiality or exert improper influence on key actors of the trial, such as 
the judge, the jurors, the witnesses, or the parties to the proceeding. Conduct typically treated as con-
tempt by English courts are direct or indirect statements of guilt, prejudging the merits of the case, pub-
lication of inadmissible evidence (such as prior convictions of the accused), pressure on witnesses, pub-
lication of the photograph of an accused when identification is an issue at trial. For a detailed overview, 
see ARLIDGE, EADY & SMITH, supra note 24, at 359; MILLER, supra note 24, at 305. 
 48. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, c.49, § 2. 
 49. See CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 479 (1993); Chesterman, supra note 8, at 521. 
 50. See infra III.B. 
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of influencing public opinion and hence prejudicing the decision by the court, is 
punishable from one up to three months imprisonment.”51 
This was conceived as a typical press crime: reference is made only to state-
ments published in “print media” (Druckschriften). As a consequence, the de-
velopment of electronics made it necessary to amend this provision to encom-
pass other kinds of publications as well. This task was accomplished by the 
Media Act of 1981 (as amended in 1992).52 Section 23 of the Media Act, entitled 
“Prohibited influence on criminal proceedings,” states that “[a]nyone who dis-
cusses, subsequent to the indictment . . . [and] before the judgment at first in-
stance in criminal proceedings, the probable outcome of those proceedings or 
the value of evidence in a way capable [geeignet] of influencing the outcome of 
the proceedings shall be punished by the court with up to 180 day-fines.”53 
Provisions aimed at protecting the fairness of proceedings and the role of 
courts as legitimate forums for settlement of disputes may be found in France as 
well. Article 227 of the Criminal Code was enacted in 1958 “in conscious imita-
tion of contempt and amid a chorus of indignant opposition from the media.”54 
It introduced a mechanism similar to the sub judice rule, imposing fines and im-
prisonment on “who[]ever has published, before a definitive court decision, 
commentaries which tend to exert pressure on the statement of witnesses or on 
decisions of the judge . . . or on the judgment.”55 This provision has now been 
repealed and substituted by Article 434-16 of the new Criminal Code of 1994, 
which prohibits “[t]he publication, prior to the pronouncement of the final judi-
cial decision, of comments tending to exert pressure on the testimony of wit-
nesses or on the decision of the judicial investigating authority or trial court.”56 
Although this provision displays some similarities to its English counterpart, it 
is not exactly equivalent: common-law contempt requires a simple “influence” 
on the proceedings; Article 434-16 is confined to publications resulting in “pres-
 
 51. Betreffend einige Ergänzungen des Allgemeinen und des Militaer-Strafgesetzes 8 
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl.], at 161, 163 (Dec. 17, 1862), translated by author, available at 
http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgicontent/annoplus?apm=0&aid=rgb&datum=18630004&zoom=2&seite=0000016
1&x=20&y=6. This article was slightly amended in 1929 by Art. VIII of the Strafgesetznovelle, Womit 
einige Bestimmungen des Strafgesetzes, des Preßgesetzes und des Einfürungsgesetzes zur 
Strafprozeßordnung abgeändert werden [Strafgesetznovelle] 440 Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGB1. I], at 
1815 (Dec. 20, 1929), available at http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/anno-plus?aid=bgb&datum= 
19290004&seite=00001815. 
 52. Most European countries have enacted special statutes aimed at guaranteeing and regulating 
the exercise of freedom of the press. See Pnina Lahav, An Outline for a General Theory of Press Law in 
Democracy, in PRESS LAWS IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 346 (Pnina Lahav 
ed., 1985). 
 53. Bundesgesetz über die Presse und andere Publizistische Medien [MedG] BGBl. No. 314/1981, § 
23 (as amended by subsequent laws), translated in Worm v. Austria, App. No. 83/1996/702/894, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at [23] (Aug. 29, 1997), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F6 
9A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=668&sessionId=7866883&skin=hudoc-en&attach 
ment=true. 
 54. See Chesterman, supra note 8, at 539. 
 55. On this provision, see VAN NIEKERK, supra note 20, at 118. 
 56. See JEAN LARGUIER & ANNE-MARIE LARGUIER, DROIT PÉNAL SPÉCIAL 409 (2002). 
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sures.” The objective element of the crime is therefore more narrowly framed, 
in light of the fact that it requires efforts devoted to exert a pressure.57 
However, the most striking differences between the English and the Conti-
nental approaches are not to be found in black-letter law, but in the enforce-
ment of such rules. In Britain, the list of precedents dealing with the sub judice 
rule is impressive.58 Every journalist or publisher is aware of the risks involved 
in reporting on criminal matters. Although the recent trend is definitely more 
liberal than in the past and the policy of issuing guidelines is increasingly pre-
ferred to tough prosecution,59 infringing these rules is still risky and can trigger 
heavy sanctions. Therefore, the media is on average cautious in disclosing facts 
or expressing statements of opinion likely to interfere with pending proceed-
ings. It has been reported, for instance, that The New York Times has recently 
stopped online readers in England from accessing an article that disclosed the 
identities of some individuals suspected of acts of terrorism.60 By the same to-
ken, in July 2007 some British newspapers refrained from publishing the photos 
of Mohammed Asha, a doctor allegedly involved in a plot to bomb the Glasgow 
Airport. Scotland Yard had expressly requested that media organizations not 
publish photos of people involved in the case, arguing that the identification of 
the suspects could be an issue in any trials concerning the plot.61 
By contrast, media reporting that is likely to have an impact upon judicial 
proceedings is rarely prosecuted on the Continent. This is the case in France, 
whose Article 434-16 of the Penal Code is seldom enforced, as confirmed by the 
dearth of precedents.62 The Austrian experience is only slightly different. On the 
one hand, Section 23 of the Media Act has been paid more attention than its 
French counterpart. Indeed, some applications of this provision are quite inter-
esting and worthy of reflection.63 On the other hand, Austrian commentators 
 
 57. See Chesterman, supra note 8, at 539. 
 58. This abundance is evidenced by the ponderous volume on contempt of court by MILLER, supra 
note 24, at 207 (discussing the sub judice rule and providing an overview of the English case-law). 
 59. See the Preface to the Third Edition of ALRIDGE, EADY & SMITH ON CONTEMPT, supra note 
24, at V. 
 60. See Note, Media Liability for Reporting Suspects’ Identities, supra note 22, at 1047. 
 61. Eric Pfanner, Did Photos of Suspects Break Law? In Era of Global News, U.K. Journalists 
Chafe at Restrictions on Coverage, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 9, 2007, at 10. 
 62. Emmanuel Derieux, Secret de l’instruction et droit à l’information, 386 LES PETITES AFFICHES 
6 (June 11, 1997); only a few (old) precedents are reported in the short commentaries edited by HERVE 
PELLETIER & JEAN PERFETTI, CODE PÉNAL, sub Art. 434-16 (2005); YVES MAYAUD, CODE PÉNAL, 
sub Art. 434-16 (2008). 
 63. See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals] Wien Dec. 11, 1989, 27 Bs 329/89, in 
MEDIEN UND RECHT 16 (1990). In 1989 some journalists were convicted because they published and 
commented on a poll in which the readers were invited to express their opinions about the outcome of 
a criminal trial, taking side either for the solution given by the jury or by the judge. Here, the enforce-
ment of Section 23 of the Media Act was directed at protecting the role of courts as the proper forum 
for the settlement of legal disputes and at insulating jurors and judges from external influences. Such 
“speech” was considered particularly objectionable as coming close to a trial carried out not in the 
name of the People, but rather by the People. Interestingly, a similar rule has been introduced in 
France by the new Article 35ter (2) of the Press Act of 1881, as amended by Law No. 2000-516 of June 
15, 2000. This provision prohibits any person from carrying out, publishing, or commenting on an opin-
ion poll concerning either the guilt of an individual charged with a crime or the proper sentence. It is 
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have observed that, in light of the particular procedural constraints and differ-
ent payoffs for the parties, the most effective way to counter adverse publicity is 
not criminal prosecution, but civil action.64 Sections 7a and 7b of the Media Act 
offer a consistent basis for redress against infringements of the presumption of 
innocence and other personal interests by the mass media. As a matter of fact, 
most of the Austrian judgments have been rendered under the heading of Sec-
tions 7a and 7b.65 Relatively few, by contrast, are rulings pertaining to Section 23 
of the Media Act.66 
B. Pretrial Secrecy 
Despite the relevance of the French and Austrian models, most civil-law ju-
risdictions have resisted the introduction of a sub judice rule.67 One argument 
for its rejection has been that any provision prohibiting the publication of items 
of information or statements of opinion likely to obstruct or prejudice a trial 
would be exceedingly vague and would run counter to the principle of determi-
nacy of penal sanctions (Bestimmtheitsgebot).68 Another is the concern that such 
a rule would be overprotective, chilling open debate and public scrutiny on the 
workings of the justice system.69 Arguments of this kind have shaped the discus-
sion in Germany, where a bill directed at the introduction of a “contempt by 
publication” rule was actually proposed in 1962 but never enacted.70 It is likely 
that similar thoughts lie behind the underenforcement of the French and Aus-
trian provisions. 
By contrast, concerns for freedom of speech tend to vanish when pretrial se-
crecy (secret de l’instruction) is taken into account. Penal sanctions directed at 
preventing the disclosure of specific information are laid down by many Euro-
 
also forbidden to publish information, such as an Internet address, capable of facilitating access to such 
opinion polls or open consultations. See generally Emmanuel Derieux, La loi du 15 juin 2000 et le droit 
de la communication, 389 LES PETITES AFFICHES 16 (July 18, 2000). 
 64. BRANDSTETTER & SCHMID, KOMMENTAR ZUM MEDIENGESETZ 248 (1999). 
 65. For an analysis of Sections 7a and 7b and references to some Austrian cases, see infra III.E.1–2. 
See also GERHARD LITZKA & IRIS STREBINGER, MEDIENGESETZ: KURZKOMMENTAR 64–71, 248 
(2005) (providing an overview of Austrian case law under Sections 7a and 7b and noting the small 
number of convictions under Section 23 of the Media Act). 
 66. The experience has been similar under Article VIII of the Strafgesetznovelle 1862, 440 BGB1.I, 
at 1815 (as amended in 1929). See BORNKAMM, supra note 20, at 234–35. 
 67. Hassemer, supra note 13, at 1924, talks about an enduring “skepticism” toward the doctrine of 
contempt of court. 
 68. See Roxin, supra note 39, at 155. 
 69. BORNKAMM, supra note 20, at 231; Hassemer, supra note 13, at 1927; Roxin, supra note 39, at 
155. 
 70. See Section 452 of the Government Bill of 1962, Störung der Rechtspflege (reproduced in 
BORNKAMM, supra note 20, at 229 n.49). For a discussion of this bill and an analysis of the previous leg-
islative proposals aimed at controlling prejudicial publicity, see BRAUN, supra note 20, at 182; Roxin, 
supra note 39, at 154–55; Rolf Stürner, Schutz des Gerichtsverfahrens vor öffentlicher Einflußnahme?, 
33 JURISTEN ZEITUNG [JZ] 161, 163 (1978). Among the first proponents of a stricter media regulation, 
see also EBERHARD SCHMID, JUSTIZ UND PUBLIZISTIK 61 (1968). 
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pean legal systems, as in France71 or in Italy.72 Even countries, such as Germany, 
that have resisted the introduction of a sub judice rule commonly rely upon such 
prohibitions.73 
How can this inconsistency be explained? Arguably, cultural and institu-
tional factors have determined the approach taken by the legal systems. The 
presence of an all-lay jury, the rules of evidence, but also the unique role played 
by the judiciary in the evolution of the English society74 are some of the crucial 
elements that explain the great relevance of the law of contempt in the Anglo 
American context. By the same token, the legacies of a nonadversarial model of 
criminal procedure arguably lie beneath rules proscribing the disclosure of 
items of information or documents in the pretrial stage.75 
Adversarial systems are based on the idea of openness of the judicial pro-
ceedings.76 Consequently, they are suspicious of any form of “secrecy” in the 
administration of justice, according to the principle that “justice should not only 
be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”77 By con-
trast, the so-called inquisitorial models cannot get rid of some sort of secrecy.78 
 
 71. Article 11 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “except where the law pro-
vides otherwise and subject to the defendant’s rights, the enquiry and investigation proceedings are se-
cret.” CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] art. 11. It also states that “any person contributing 
to such proceedings is subjected to professional secrecy under the conditions and subject to the penal-
ties set out by articles 226-13 and 226-14 of the Criminal Code” Id. (English translation provided by the 
official Web site “Legifrance,” available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c= 
34&r=3886#art16975). See MICHELE LAURE RASSAT, TRAITÉ DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE 588 (2001). 
 72. Although Italy uses a (mixed) adversarial model of criminal procedure, see William T. Pizzi & 
Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversar-
ial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT’L LAW 1, 2–3, 7, 10, 35 (1992), the principle 
of secrecy has not been abandoned. Article 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits the disclo-
sure of specific items of information until the moment when the accused is allowed to have knowledge 
of them. CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P.] art. 329. Article 114 (1) of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure forbids the partial or total publication of any documents covered by secrecy. Art. 114(1). Penal-
ties for the breach of such provisions are laid down by Article 684 of the Penal Code. CODICE PENALE 
[C.P.] art. 684. For details, see FRANCESCA M. MOLINARI, IL SEGRETO INVESTIGATIVO 203–18 (2003). 
 73. Section 353d(3) of the German Penal Code provides that  
whoever . . . publicly communicates, verbatim, essential parts or all of the accusatory pleading 
or other official documents of a criminal proceeding, a proceeding to impose a civil penalty or 
a disciplinary proceeding, before they have been argued in a public hearing or the proceeding 
has been concluded, shall be punished with imprisonment for no more than one year or a fine. 
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] § 353d(3) (translation to English provided by the Federal Ministry of Justice 
and available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm). For a detailed analysis of the problems 
involved in the relationship between media freedom and pretrial secrecy, see Thomas Weigend, Medi-
enöffentlichkeit des Ermittlungsverfahrens?, in ALTERNATIV-ENTWURF STRAFJUSTIZ UND MEDIEN 33 
(Arbeitskreis AE ed., 2004). 
 74. See RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 9–16 (1963); Chesterman, supra note 8, 
at 547–57. 
 75. See Lemonde, supra note 20, at 691. 
 76. See JACONELLI, supra note 38, at 1–67. 
 77. Lord Hewart, C.J., in R v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, (1924) 1 K.B. 256, 259. 
 78. See FRANCO CORDERO, PROCEDURA PENALE 350 (2006). 
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This is true for the preparatory stage, while the main hearing is generally open 
to the public.79 
Without going into further details, it is worth inquiring into the aims pur-
sued and the practical import of such rules. It is commonly argued that their ra-
tionale is twofold.80 On the one hand, consistent with an inquisitorial frame-
work, they pursue the goal of enhancing the chances of a proper investigation, 
since an unrestrained diffusion of the information gathered by the prosecutor 
and the police could arguably obstruct the acquisition of further evidence.81 On 
the other, they are directed at the protection of a suspect’s personality interests. 
It is feared, in other words, that the publication of documents and materials per-
taining to the preparatory stage would expose an individual’s presumption of 
innocence, reputation, and privacy to peril before any conclusive evidence of 
guilt is given. 
C. The Gap between the Law in the Books and the Law in Action 
In theory, the deterrent effect of penal sanctions should ensure results simi-
lar to those afforded by the English sub judice rule. In practice, however, the 
rules on secrecy are frequently circumvented, and the efficacy of such statutory 
devices is highly questionable.82 In Italy, for instance, it is not unusual for 
prominent defendants to learn of a notice of prosecution (informazione di ga-
ranzia) through the newspapers rather than through an official communication 
by prosecutorial authorities.83 In the same vein, witness statements or wiretap-
ping transcripts are often published by the press in violation of law, with the 
consequence of nullifying the provisions on pretrial secrecy. As it has become 
sadly apparent in some recent murder cases, trial by media is a phenomenon all 
too common in Italy.84 
 
 79. See European Convention, supra note 28, Article 6 (1), which states the principle that “judg-
ment shall be pronounced publicly,” but admits that 
the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, 
public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the 
protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice. 
 80. See MOLINARI, supra note 72, at 251–52; Derieux, supra note 62, at 6; Weigend, supra note 73, 
at 36. See also the discussion in Dupuis v. France, App. No. 1914/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. at [32], [44] (Nov. 12, 
2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF 
01C1166DEA398649&key=62703&sessionId=14267304&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true (stressing 
that the rules on pretrial secrecy pursue legitimate aims, since they are directed at the protection of a 
defendant’s reputation, presumption of innocence, and the authority and impartiality of the judiciary). 
 81. See Weigend, supra note 73, at 47. 
 82. See GLAUCO GIOSTRA, PROCESSO PENALE E INFORMAZIONE 231–76 (1989) (Italy); Lemonde, 
supra note 20, at 700–07. 
 83. See MICHELE BONETTI, RISERVATEZZA E PROCESSO PENALE 153 (2003). 
 84. See Magnus Linklater, Whether Meredith or Madeleine, It’s Trial by Media, THE TIMES, Nov. 
14, 2007, at 19 (discussing the attitudes of Italian mass media toward the criminal proceedings concern-
ing the murder of an English student in Perugia); Luca Marafioti, Il circolo vizioso cronaca-indagini 
conduce all’errore giudiziario, IL RIFORMISTA, Nov. 21, 2007, at 6. 
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Similar results have been reported in France and Belgium, whereas in Ger-
many the situation seems only slightly better.85 Several reasons may explain the 
observed clash between theory and practice. First, most of the provisions on 
pretrial secrecy are affected by a structural underinclusiveness. Due to poor 
drafting, their scope of application is exceedingly narrow and the chances of ef-
fective enforcement are by themselves quite small.86 For instance, Article 11 of 
the French Code of Criminal Procedure is not directly binding on journalists;87 
on the other hand, Section 353d, n. 3 of the German Penal Code, although ap-
plicable to the media, prevents only the verbatim publication of entire or partial 
excerpts of the official documents and not accounts inspired by them.88 
Second, in many cases the primary sources of the information illegally pub-
lished are prosecutorial authorities and police services.89 Therefore, law en-
forcement has no strong incentive to actually prosecute breaches of the rules on 
pretrial secrecy. Moreover, regulations allowing journalists to not disclose the 
sources of their information add an additional barrier to the effective enforce-
ment of these provisions.90 
 
 85. See ANTOINE GARAPON, I CUSTODI DEI DIRITTI: GIUSTIZIA E DEMOCRAZIA 61 (1997) (tran-
slating LE GARDIEN DES PROMESSES: JUSTICE ET DÉMOCRATIE into Italian); Lemonde, supra note 20, 
at 698–707. 
 86. See Weigend, supra note 73, at 40. 
 87. Since Article 11 subjects to professional secrecy “any person contributing to such proceedings,” 
it is undisputed that only the public authorities involved in the proceedings (judges, prosecutors, po-
licemen, et cetera) are bound by such a provision, but not the media and other trial participants (such 
as the defendant, the witness, the partie civile, or their lawyers). See EMMANUEL DERIEUX, DROIT DES 
MÉDIAS 97 (2001); RASSAT, supra note 71, at 589; GASTON STEFANI, GEORGES LEVASSEUR & 
BERNARD BOULOC, PROCÉDURE PÉNALE 568 (2001); Danièle Mayer, L’information du public par la 
presse sur les affaires en cours d’instruction, RECUEIL DALLOZ, chronique 80 (1995). However, the me-
dia could be held accountable not only for complicity in the principal offence of unlawful disclosure, 
but also for the crime of recel. See Derieux, supra note 62. This crime consists of “the concealment, re-
tention or transfer [of] a thing, or acting as an intermediary in its transfer, knowing that that thing was 
obtained by a felony or misdemeanour”; and also in the “the act of knowingly benefiting in any manner 
from the product of a felony or misdemeanour.” LARGUIER & LARGUIER, supra note 56, at 272 (dis-
cussing Art. 321-1 of the Penal Code). According to the case law, a journalist could be convicted for the 
crime of “receiving” if he publishes information obtained in breach of pretrial or professional secrecy 
and is aware that the sources were illegal. See the decisions cited by Lyn François, Le droit de la presse 
et la diffamation devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 684, 685 
(2005). This is quite a tough solution and indeed has been found by the European Court of Human 
Rights to contrast with Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. See Dupuis v. France, 
App. No. 1914/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. at [44]–[49] (Nov. 12, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/ 
viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=62703&session
Id=14267304&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. 
 88. See Jürgen-Peter Graf, Sub § 353d, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM STRAFGESETZBUCH, 
IV, at 2088 (Wolfgang Joecks & Klaus Miebach eds., 2006); Roxin, supra note 39, at 156. 
 89. See GIOSTRA, supra note 82, at 236. For some critical remarks about the information politics of 
police and prosecutorial authorities in Germany, see Roxin, supra note 39, at 158. 
 90. As is well known, in Europe journalists are granted special protection with respect to the dis-
closure of the sources of information. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17488/90, 22 Eur.  
H.R. Rep. 123, [46] (1996), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action= 
open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=555&sessionId=14267304&skin=hudo
c-en&attachment=true; Roemen v. Luxembourg, App. No. 51772/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. at [46], [57]–[60] 
(May 25, 2003), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8 
FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=3538&sessionId=14267304&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true; 
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Most importantly, the policy supporting pretrial secrecy is losing social ac-
ceptance and appears in many respects to be outdated.91 The underlying as-
sumption of this model is that whereas the main hearing should be entirely open 
to the public, the preliminary stage—when evidence is being collected and the 
public charge is being prepared—should remain secret. However, people are 
much more interested in the preparatory stage, rather than in the main hear-
ing.92 The latter, in a civilian context, is a highly technical event, lacking the 
dramatic aura typical of common-law trials, and is therefore not as spectacular. 
The former, on the contrary, is the moment of mystery and suspense, with the 
highest news and entertainment value. 
In a media-dominated atmosphere, to maintain a veil of silence on the pre-
trial stage—especially when it lasts for a long time93—appears utopian. This sort 
of utopia is all but harmless, however, since the circulation of unchecked infor-
mation may actually have much more serious and lasting effects on the reputa-
tion and personal dignity of the defendants than a transparent and truthful dis-
closure. Not surprisingly, several scholars have made a case for the 
abandonment of the traditional approach, advocating the need for more and 
better information relating to the preparatory stage.94 Legislative reforms in this 
direction have been undertaken in some jurisdictions.95 
D. Information Politics 
The process of information exchange between judicial authorities, police of-
ficers, public prosecutors, and the media is one of the most critical points for 
any reform.96 Journalists receive much of their information concerning criminal 
 
Roger Errera, Freedom of Speech in Europe and in the USA, in EUROPEAN AND US 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 42, at 43–44. 
 91. See Lemonde, supra note 20, at 701–02; Weigend, supra note 73, at 33. 
 92. Hassemer, supra note 13, at 1927. 
 93. Particularly instructive, from this point of view, is the situation of fact in Dupuis: pretrial se-
crecy was breached three years after the beginning of the investigations; the criminal proceedings lasted 
about twelve years. App. No. 1914/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. at [25], [44] (Nov. 12, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe. 
int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=62
703&sessionId=14267304&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. It is clear that the public’s right to know 
is frustrated when trials last so long. Consequently the media, especially in State-affair cases like Du-
puis, have a greater incentive to circumvent the rules on pretrial secrecy. 
 94. See ALTERNATIV-ENTWURF STRAFJUSTIZ UND MEDIEN, supra note 73, at 18; Derieux, supra 
note 62; Lemonde, supra note 20, at 691–92. 
 95. In France, for instance, the Law No. 2000-516 of June 15, 2000, art. 96, amending art. 11 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, has reduced the strictness of the principle of secret de l’instruction. The 
new text of art. 11, third sentence, provides that, although the pretrial stage remains secret, “in order to 
prevent the dissemination of incomplete or inaccurate information,” the district prosecutor may, “on 
his own motion or at the request of the investigating court or parties, publicise objective matters related 
to the procedure that convey no judgment as to whether the charges brought against the defendants are 
well founded.” See id. See generally Pierre Cramier, Présomption d’innocence, droits des victimes et li-
berté de l’information (Les modifications apportées à la législation sur la presse par la loi du 15 juin 
2000), 391 LES PETITES AFFICHES 6 (Jan. 14, 2002). 
 96. See Hassemer, supra note 13, at 1928; Bernd J. Fehn & Heinz M. Horst, Behördliche Pressear-
beit bei strafprozessualen Maßnahmen: Zum Spannungsfeld zwischen öffentlichen Informations und 
Geheimhaltungsinteressen, ARCHIV FÜR PRESSERECHT [AFP] 13 (2007) (F.R.G.); Jochen Schroers, 
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proceedings from law-enforcement sources and prosecutors.97 The rules on pre-
trial secrecy give some guidance about the items of information that should not 
be disclosed to the public. By contrast, the statutes generally say nothing about 
the interactions between public authorities and the media. 
This matter is commonly left to professional ethics. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the practices of information policy tend to vary significantly 
across Europe.98 On the one hand, there are models in which judges’ and prose-
cutors’ freedom of speech is highly valued and not subjected to severe con-
straints.99 On the other, there are systems in which official communication with 
the media is regulated according to the principle of hierarchical authority and 
therefore remains under stricter control.100 
 
Versteckte Probleme bei der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Staatsanwaltschaften und Medien, 43 NJW 969 
(1996) (F.R.G.). On the information exchange between trial participants and reporters, see generally C. 
Thomas Dienes, Trial Participants in the Newsgathering Process, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1107 (2001) (ar-
guing “for strict scrutiny review of direct restraints on lawyer speech and of indirect restraints on news-
gathering based on the personal and societal interests implicated”). 
 97. This trend is pervasive. See BORNKAMM, supra note 20, at 241; Robert E. Drechsel, An Alter-
native View of Media–Judiciary Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial 
& Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 35 (1989) (noting that data from Minnesota show “the 
heavy reliance of journalists on law enforcement sources and prosecutors confirm the appropriateness 
of focusing attention on those sources when attempting to control pretrial publicity”); Lia Sava, Il rap-
porto tra magistrato e organi di informazione nella fase delle indagini preliminari: punti fermi e problemi 
aperti nell’esperienza concreta, unpublished manuscript presented at the Conference on “Magistratura e 
mass media,” organized by the Italian Judicial Council (CSM), Rome, April 3, 2006, at 33 (on file with 
author); Brandwood, supra note 1, at 1448. 
 98. For details, see the national reports presented at the Council of Europe Symposium on “Justice 
and the Media,” Cracow (Pol.), April 25–26, 2005, http://www.coe.int/t/dg1/legalcooperation/ 
judicialprofessions/ccje/meetings/Conferences/default_en.asp. 
 99. This has been the law in action in Italy for a long time, where judicial and prosecutorial au-
thorities have on occasion frankly abused their freedom of speech, contributing to a kind of “spectacu-
larization” of justice. See Lemonde, supra note 20, at 706–07; Sava, supra note 97, at 2, 32–33. However, 
a recent reform has severely restricted judges’ and public prosecutors’ discretion in interacting with the 
media. An act passed in 2006 has strengthened the rules of professional conduct, preventing judges 
from revealing documents covered by pretrial secrecy and by issuing statements and giving interviews 
about persons involved in pending proceedings, if this may cause prejudice to the rights of others. Leg. 
Decree No. 109 of Feb. 23, 2006, Art. 2u, v, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana [Gazz. Uff.] of 
Mar. 21, 2006, no. 67, as amended by Law No. 469 of Oct. 24, 2006, Gazz. Uff. of Oct. 24, 2006, no. 248. 
Furthermore, the power of briefing the media about ongoing activities has been conferred only to the 
head of the public prosecutor’s office (Procuratore della Repubblica) and her representatives. Art. 5 [1], 
Leg. Decree No. 106 of Feb. 20, 2006, art. 5[1], Gazz. Uff. of Mar. 20, 2006, no. 66. Consequently, no 
deputy prosecutor shall have the right to inform the press or issue public statements about the office’s 
activity. Leg. Decree No. 106 of Feb. 20, 2006, art. 5[3]. The violation of these rules may expose both 
judges and public prosecutors to disciplinary proceedings. See generally Riccardo Fuzio, Le dichiarazi-
oni dei magistrati agli organi di informazione: limiti e rilevanza disciplinare, 130 Foro Italiano V [Foro 
It. V] 70 (2007) (discussing the issue of public statements by judges and prosecutors under the new 
regulation); Federico Sorrentino, Prime osservazioni sulla nuova disciplina degli illeciti disciplinari dei 
magistrati, QUESTIONE GIUSTIZIA 54 (2007) (providing an overview of the reform of disciplinary pro-
ceedings). 
 100. This is the case in Germany, where only a limited number of public officials are authorized to 
give information to the press. See Lemonde, supra note 20, at 698–99. Usually the head of the public 
prosecutor’s office is in charge of the contacts with the press in the preliminary stage: “[N]o deputy 
prosecutor, or officer in charge of the investigation has the right to inform the press, and this ban is well 
respected (failure by an individual to respect this ban would have repercussions on his career).” Id. at 
698. Press offices are also to be found in main regional police departments. See ANNEGRET KREISEL, 
OPFERSCHUTZ UND MEDIENINTERESSE 45 (2004). 
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Rather than focus on the various national experiences, it is worth recalling a 
recent Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, “on the provision of information through the media in relation to 
criminal proceedings.”101 This Recommendation is nonbinding, but it has per-
suasive value. Indeed, it was recently cited and taken into account by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in Dupuis v. France.102 
After having recalled the right of the public to receive information about the 
activities of judicial authorities and police services and the freedom of the me-
dia to provide it, the Recommendation lays down some substantial and proce-
dural criteria, which should be observed by member states in regulating the 
provision of information to the media. The first substantial limit is represented 
by respecting the presumption of innocence. According to Principle 2, ap-
pended to the Recommendation, “opinions and information relating to on go-
ing criminal proceedings should only be communicated or disseminated through 
the media where this does not prejudice the presumption of innocence of the 
suspect or accused.”103 The violation of this principle, which is also applicable to 
nonjudicial authorities, may give rise to an action for damages against the 
state.104 Furthermore, Principle 10 provides that “in the context of criminal pro-
ceedings, particularly those involving juries or lay judges, judicial authorities 
and police services should abstain from publicly providing information which 
bears a risk of substantial prejudice to the fairness of the proceedings.”105 This is 
also consistent with the Strasbourg case law.106 
 
 101. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, RECOMMENDATION REC (2003) 13 OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS 
TO MEMBER STATES ON THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE MEDIA IN RELATION TO 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (adopted July 10, 2003). 
 102. App. No. 1914/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. at [20], [42] (Nov. 12, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int//// 
tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=62703
&sessionId=14267304&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. 
 103. RECOMMENDATION REC (2003) 13, supra note 101, at app. Principles concerning the provision 
of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings, Principle 2. 
 104. This principle was confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in the leading case Al-
lenet de Ribemont v. France, App. No. 15175/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. at [35]–[36] (Feb. 10, 1995),  
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C116
6DEA398649&key=61929&sessionId=14267304&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true (holding that “pre-
sumption of innocence may be infringed not only by a judge or court but also by other public authori-
ties”), and more recently in Y.B. v. Turkey, App. Nos. 48173/99, 48319/99 Eur. Ct. H.R. at [44], [47]–
[51] (Jan. 28, 2005) http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8 
FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=9404&sessionId=14267541&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. 
 105. RECOMMENDATION REC (2003) 13, supra note 101, at app. Principles concerning the provision 
of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings, Principle 10. 
 106. See Buscemi v. Italy, App. No. 29569/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. at [68] (Sept. 16, 1999), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C116
6DEA398649&key=885&sessionId=14267936&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true (“The judicial au-
thorities are required to exercise maximum discretion with regard to the cases with which they deal in 
order to preserve their image as impartial judges. That discretion should dissuade them from making 
use of the press, even when provoked. It is the higher demands of justice and the elevated nature of ju-
dicial office which impose that duty.”). 
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The second substantial constraint protects the privacy of trial participants.107 
Particular care should also be taken to avoid any disclosure of a witness’ iden-
tity, “unless a witness has given his or her prior consent, the identification of a 
witness is of public concern, or the testimony has already been given in pub-
lic.”108 
Regarding procedural criteria, the Recommendation stresses the importance 
of nondiscrimination and regular provision of information in high-profile cases. 
According to Principle 4, “when journalists have lawfully obtained information 
in the context of on going criminal proceedings from judicial authorities or po-
lice services, those authorities and services should make available such informa-
tion, without discrimination, to all journalists who make or have made the same 
request.”109 With respect to high-profile cases, “judicial authorities and police 
services should inform the media about their essential acts, so long as this does 
not prejudice the secrecy of the investigations and police enquiries or delay or 
impede the outcome of the proceedings.”110 In general, it is recommended that 
the provision of information should be carried out “through press conferences 
by authorised officers or similar authorised means.”111 
Last, Principle 7 prohibits the exploitation of information about ongoing 
criminal proceedings “for commercial purposes or purposes other than those 
relevant to the enforcement of the law.”112 The issue of “checkbook journalism,” 
for example, has been intensively discussed in recent years in Europe and 
abroad.113 Some countries have enacted statutes comparable to the U.S. “Son of 
Sam” laws, with the aim of preventing criminals from profiting from the com-
mercial exploitation of the criminal event at the (emotional and material) ex-
 
 107. RECOMMENDATION REC (2003) 13, supra note 101, at app. Principles concerning the provision 
of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings, Principle 8. See Craxi v. Italy (No. 
2), App. No. 25337/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. at [66]–[76] (Mar. 5, 2003), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int//// 
tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=7933&s
essionId=14267202&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true (holding the State responsible for the publica-
tion in some newspapers of telephone interceptions of a strictly private nature, in violation of the right 
to private life guaranteed by art. 8 of the Convention. Such interceptions had been carried out by the 
police, investigating corruption charges brought against the plaintiff, and filed in the public prosecutor’s 
registry. Either by a malfunction of the registry or by communication with one of the parties to the pro-
ceedings, some journalists came in possession of the bulk of the transcripts and published them. Refer-
ring to the doctrine of positive obligations to protect fundamental rights, the Court affirmed the State’s 
liability on two grounds: (1) the authorities failed to provide safe custody of the transcripts, and (2) no 
effective inquiry was carried out after the violation to sanction the persons responsible for the wrong 
doing). 
 108. RECOMMENDATION REC (2003) 13, supra note 101, at app. Principles Concerning the Provision 
of Information Through the Media in Relation to Criminal Proceedings, Principle 16. 
 109. Id. at Principle 4. 
 110. Id. at Principle 6. 
 111. Id. at Principle 5. 
 112. Id. at Principle 7. 
 113. See JACONELLI, supra note 38, at 266; KREISEL, supra note 100, at 161; Louis Blom-Cooper, 
Cheque-book Journalism on Display, PUB. L. 378 (2003); Colin Munro, When Criminals Sell Their Sto-
ries, PUB. L. 55, 58 (2006); Lutz Tillmanns, Mediale Vermarktung von Verbrechen und Grundsätze eines 
fair trial, http://www.kanzlei-prof-schweizer.de/bibliothek/content/tillmanns_mediale_vermarktung. 
html (last visited Nov. 29, 2007). 
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pense of their victims.114 Similarly, some Press Councils have chosen to strictly 
limit the admissibility of payments to witnesses (and sometimes to criminals), in 
order to avoid prejudicing proceedings.115 In light of these findings, it seems ap-
propriate to recommend that public bodies should also abstain from exploiting 
information pertaining to criminal proceedings for financial reasons or for pur-
poses other than those relevant to law enforcement. 
E. Private-Law Remedies 
Penal provisions on pretrial secrecy are not the only sources of court-related 
speech restraints. They represent just a single element of a more-complex mo-
saic and are of limited practical importance. These provisions are supplemented 
in most Continental legal systems by private-law remedies aimed at furthering 
the interests in the privacy, dignity, and reputation of trial participants. 
Indeed, unfair media coverage of criminal cases may not only hinder the 
proper functioning of justice, but also infringe fundamental rights of the parties 
to the proceedings, irrespective of its outcomes.116 Stigma and humiliation may 
derive from a suspect’s simply being charged, adhering to the individual even 
after acquittal (labeling effect).117 Indeed, the court of public opinion can impose 
ancillary reputational sanctions, which are independent from the judicial ascer-
tainment of truth and which tend to persist long after the conclusion of the pro-
ceedings.118 
Also, the personal well-being of the victim or the witness of a criminal of-
fense may be seriously affected by an unrestrained exercise of media freedom.119 
 
 114. Particularly significant is the German Law of 1998 on victims’ guarantees (Opferanspruchssi-
cherungsgesetz); for a detailed analysis, see MEIKO STENGER, DAS 
OPFERANSPRUCHSSICHERUNGSGESETZ: DER ZUGRIFF DES OPFERS EINER STRAFTAT AUF DIE 
MEDIENERLÖSE DES TÄTERS UNTER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDER 
SACHVERHALTE (2006); Magdalene Kläver, ‘Dornröschenschlaf’ des Opferanspruchssicherungsgeset-
zes, JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU 177 (2004). 
 115. In England in 1996, after the trial of Rosemary West, R v. West, (1996) 2 Cr. App. R. 374, the 
Lord Chancellor’s Department promoted a discussion paper on “payments to witnesses,” which was 
followed by another consultation paper in March 2002. Eventually, it was decided to leave the matter to 
self-regulation. See ARLIDGE, EADY & SMITH, supra note 24. Accordingly, the Press Complaints 
Commission has amended its Code of Practice by prohibiting—or at least strictly limiting—payments to 
witnesses and criminals. See Louis Blom-Cooper, supra note 113, at 378–79. 
 116. See Joachim Bornkamm, Die Berichterstattung über schwebende Strafverfahren und das 
Persönlichkeitsrecht des Beschuldigten, NSTZ 102 (1983) (F.R.G.); Franz Riklin & Frank Höpfel, 
Verletzung der Unschuldsvermutung, in ALTERNATIV-ENTWURF STRAFJUSTIZ UND MEDIEN, supra 
note 73, at 54. 
 117. See Scheer, supra note 39, at 39. For an illustrative case of unfair media reporting with nefari-
ous personal consequences, see Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 5, 1963, 16 
NJW 904 (F.R.G.), in which a commercial agent, before any conviction, was depicted in the press as 
one of the instigators of a gang of burglars and dealers in stolen goods. 
 118. “Ancillary sanction” (zusätzliche Strafe) is the expression used by Bornkamm, supra note 116, 
at 108. See also Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, Comunicazione, reputazione, sanzione, DIRITTO 
DELL’INFORMAZIONE E DELL’INFORMATICA 263, 271 (2007) (Italy) (providing an insightful analysis of 
“reputational sanctions”). 
 119. See KREISEL, supra note 100, at 11; Heinz Schöch, Schutz von Verletzten, in ALTERNATIV-
ENTWURF STRAFJUSTIZ UND MEDIEN, supra note 73, at 79. 
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In the United States, for instance, surveys have suggested that many victims do 
not report a rape to public authorities for fear of publicity and loss of privacy.120 
Continental legal systems have long since developed an articulated complex 
of rules and doctrines directed at the protection of personality rights against in-
terference by nonstate actors.121 Such remedies as injunctions, rectifications, and 
damages, commonly granted by either civil code or special statutory provisions, 
are now being increasingly employed as means of controlling the exercise of 
free speech regarding legal reporting. Arguably, if well-structured, private-law 
devices may contribute to qualitatively enhancing the level of media coverage 
of pending proceedings without excessively curbing the watch-dog function of 
the press. They represent a valid alternative to the “repressive” model of penal 
prosecution, which is frequently either overprotective122 or ineffective123 and 
should therefore be regarded as an extrema ratio.124 
1. Disclosure of a Suspect’s Identity and the Anonymity Interest 
Media freedom to provide information about ongoing proceedings fre-
quently eclipses the suspect’s interest in anonymity. Indeed, the bare fact that 
an individual has been publicly depicted as a suspect, though not necessarily 
formally charged with a criminal offense, may strongly prejudice his or her so-
cial dignity.125 Obviously, the prejudice is even greater if publicity is given to a 
charge or an indictment. 
Some legal systems, such as that in the United States, proceed from the as-
sumption that knowledge of a suspect’s identity is by itself a matter of public 
concern and therefore resolve the conflict between free speech and the ano-
 
 120. See Daniel M. Murdock, A Compelling State Interest: Constructing a Statutory Framework for 
Protecting the Identity of Rape Victims, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1177, 1177 (2007) (reporting that, according to 
a recent survey, “66% of women surveyed stated that they ‘would be more likely to report rapes if their 
identities would be protected,’ and 86% of the surveyed group thought that rape victims ‘would be “less 
likely” to report rapes if those victims believed that the news media would disclose their names’”). As is 
well known, in the United States the protection of a rape victim’s identity has become a contested issue 
since the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), and Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). See also Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W. 2d 471 
(Tex. 1995). For a comparative overview, see CAMERON, supra note 38, at 57. 
 121. See generally GUIDO ALPA & GIORGIO RESTA, LE PERSONE FISICHE E I DIRITTI DELLA 
PERSONALITÀ 361 (2006) (Italy) (providing a historical and comparative analysis of the development of 
the category of “personality rights” in European Continental law); FRANÇOIS RIGAUX, LA 
PROTECTION DE LA VIE PRIVÉE ET DES AUTRES BIENS DE LA PERSONNALITÉ (1990) (discussing 
French law on privacy and related rights and comparing it with the experience of several other coun-
tries); STIG STRÖMHOLM, RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND RIGHTS OF THE PERSONALITY: A COMPARATIVE 
SURVEY (1967) (presenting in-depth analysis of personality- and privacy-rights protections in different 
jurisdictions); Adrian Popovici, Personality Rights—A Civil Law Concept, 50 LOY. L. REV. 349 (2004) 
(discussing “personality rights” in the civil law, and problems associated with it, using Quebec as a case 
study). 
 122. In the common-law context, see FENWICK & PHILLIPSON, supra note 244, at 303–10. 
 123. See supra III.C. 
 124. See Riklin & Höpfel, supra note 116, at 58; Roxin, supra note 39, at 157. 
 125. Bornkamm, supra note 116, at 103. 
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nymity interest in favor of the former.126 By contrast, Continental jurisdictions 
accord considerable weight to a defendant’s anonymity interest—especially if 
he or she is a juvenile—and cope with the underlying conflict through a balanc-
ing process. The nature of the offense, the defendant’s status (public figure ver-
sus ordinary citizen), and the value of the evidence gathered are factors most 
commonly taken into account when deciding whether a defendant’s identity is 
admissible. 
This matter has been extensively discussed and litigated in Austria, Switzer-
land, and Germany.127 The legal systems in those countries rely on assuming that 
the publication of a suspect’s identity is not per se a matter of public interest. 
Therefore, as a general principle, his or her name and photograph cannot be 
freely dispersed prior to a trial judgment.128 However, publication of such infor-
mation may be deemed lawful if it is proved that the society has a specific inter-
est in receiving that information.129 This is the case, for instance, when (1) the al-
 
 126. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g, 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (declaring unconstitutional a state law bar-
ring publication of the names of charged juvenile offenders as long as the information was obtained 
lawfully and no substantial state interests exist); Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Okla. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 
(1977) (finding a pretrial order preventing the press from disclosing the identity of an eleven-year-old 
boy accused of murder to be unlawful under the First Amendment because the information was law-
fully obtained during a detention hearing); Macon Tele. Publ’g Co. v. Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655, 658 (Ga. 
1993) (holding that “. . . Tatum, who committed a homicide, however justified, lost her right to keep her 
name private. . . . [because she] became the object of a legitimate public interest and the newspaper had 
the right under the Federal and State Constitutions to accurately report the facts regarding the incident, 
including her name.”); see also Note, Media Liability for Reporting Suspects’ Identities, supra note 22, at 
1044; For reform proposals, see Jaime N. Morris, Note, The Anonymous Accused: Protecting Defen-
dants’ Rights in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 44 B.C. L. REV. 901 (2003) (“[A]llowing a high-profile 
criminal defendant to proceed anonymously can safeguard a defendant’s right to a fair trial . . . .”). 
 127. See BRAUN, supra note 20, at 71, 86; Robert Hauser, Das Prinzip der Öffentlichkeit der 
Gerichtsverhandlung und der Schutz der Persönlichkeit, in RECHT UND RECHTSDURCHSETZUNG: 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR H.U. WALDER ZUM 65, GEBERTSTAG, at 165, 183 (Isaak Meier ed., 1994) (Switz.); 
Gerda Müller, Probleme der Gerichtsberichterstattung, 60 NJW 1617 (2007) (F.R.G.); Franz Riklin & 
Frank Höpfel, Schutz von Beschuldigten vor identifizierender Berichterstattung, in ALTERNATIV-
ENTWURF STRAFJUSTIZ UND MEDIEN, supra note 73, at 71. See also JÖRG SOEHRING, PRESSERECHT: 
RECHERCHE, BERICHTERSTATTUNG, ANSPRÜCHE IM RECHT DER PRESSE UND DES RUNDFUNKS 348 
(1995) (F.R.G.). 
 128. Particularly significant, in this perspective, are the general principles laid down by the German 
Constitutional Court in the famous Lebach decision on the resocialization interest of the convicted. See 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] May 6, 1973, 26 NJW 1226, translated into 
English in KOMMERS, supra note 25, at 418 (holding that “the interest in receiving information is not 
absolute. The central importance of the right to personality requires not only vigilance on behalf of the 
inviolable, innermost personal sphere of the accused but also a strict regard for the principle of propor-
tionality. The invasion of the personal sphere is limited to the need to satisfy adequately the public’s 
interest in receiving information, while the harm inflicted upon the accused must be proportional to the 
seriousness of the offense or to its importance otherwise for the public. Consequently, it is not always 
permissible to disclose the name, release a picture, or use some other means of identifying the perpetra-
tor.”). With specific reference to the issue of identity disclosure before final judgment, see BGH Dec. 7, 
1999, 53 NJW 2000 (1036); OLG Braunschweig Oct. 24, 1974, 28 NJW 651. For a detailed analysis of 
this issue, see MARTIN LÖFFLER & REINHART RICKER, HANDBUCH DES PRESSERECHTS 328–29 
(2005); Bornkamm, supra note 116, at 104; Müller, supra note 127, at 1618; Riklin & Höpfel, supra note 
127, at 71; Weigend, supra note 73, at 42–44. 
 129. See BGH Dec. 7, 1999, 53 NJW 1036 (F.R.G.); BGH Nov. 15, 2005, 59 NJW 599 (F.R.G.). 
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leged crime is a major and not a lesser indictable offence,130 (2) the defendant is 
a public figure,131 and (3) the suspect’s identity is already in the public domain. 
Interestingly, this is judge-made law in Germany and Switzerland. Even the 
decisions of the German Press Council grant extensive protection to the ano-
nymity interest and conform to Guideline 8.1 (1) of the German Press-Code,132 
which provides that the press, when reporting on crimes, investigations, or tri-
als, “shall not usually publish any information in words or pictures that would 
enable identification of victims and perpetrators.”133 
By contrast, in Austria this matter is specifically regulated by statute.134 Sec-
tion 7a of the Media Act, introduced in 1992, provides that the name or likeness 
of a person who “has been the victim of an offence punishable by the courts” or 
“is suspected of having committed, or has been convicted of, a punishable of-
fence” cannot be published “where legitimate interests of that person are 
thereby injured and there is no predominant public interest in the publication of 
such details on account of the person’s position in society, of some other con-
nection with public life, or of other reasons.”135 This is a general clause that 
leaves much room for judicial discretion.136 However, the statute makes clear 
that the interest in anonymity always trumps the right of the public to be in-
 
 130. However, there are lesser indictable offenses that in some situations result in public concern. 
For an interesting case concerning an alleged fraud committed by a liquidator of a company, see OLG 
Brandenburg Dec. 15, 1995, 48 NJW 886 (887–88) (F.R.G.) (holding that financial crimes may also 
result in public concern and justify the publication of a suspect’s name and likeness). 
 131. For example, see BGH Nov. 15, 2005, 59 NJW 599 (F.R.G.), concerning a violation of the 
speed limits by Prince Ernst August von Hannover. An earlier decision concerns serious criminal of-
fences allegedly committed by a former member of the national-socialist party. See OLG Frankfurt 
Sept. 6, 1979, 33 NJW 597 (F.R.G.). 
 132. To some extent, this protection is even more than that extended by the ordinary courts. See the 
detailed analysis by LENA WALLENHORST, MEDIENPERSÖNLICHKEITSRECHT UND 
SELBSTKONTROLLE DER PRESSE: EINE VERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUM DEUTSCHEN UND 
ENGLISCHEN RECHT 401 (2007) (detailing the extent of the protection). See also HENNING MÜNCH, 
DER SCHUTZ DES EINZELNEN VOR PRESSEVERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN DURCH DEN DEUTSCHEN 
PRESSERAT UND DIE BRITISCHE PRESS COMPLAINTS COMMISSION 210–13 (2001) (providing a com-
parative analysis of English and German decisions and underlying the relevance of a suspect’s anonym-
ity interest). For an outline of the various European self-regulation models, see Vincenzo Zeno-
Zencovich, Press Codes in Europe, in THE PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS AGAINST 
INVASIONS BY MASS MEDIA 395 (Helmut Koziol & Alexander Warzilek eds., 2006). 
 133. Guideline 8.1 (5) of the Press Code also makes clear that full disclosure is allowed as regards 
public officials and elected representatives, “if there is a connection between a public office or mandate 
and a crime.” The same is said for famous people “if the crime [for] which they are accused is contrary 
to their public image.” See GERMAN PRESS CODE (German Press Council 2006), available at 
http://www.presserat.de/Press-Code.227.0.html. 
 134. For a general introduction to the Austrian laws on the protection of personality interests, see 
Helmut Koziol & Alexander Warzilek, Der Schutz der Persönlichkeitsrechte gegenüber Massenmedien 
in Österreich, in THE PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS AGAINST INVASIONS BY MASS MEDIA, 
supra note 132, at 3. 
 135. MedG BGBl. No. 314/1981, § 7a, translated in News Verlags GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria, App. 
No. 31457/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. at [33] (Apr. 11, 2000), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp? 
action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=1168&sessionId=14267936& 
skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. 
 136. For a detailed analysis of this rule and its judicial implementation, see ERNST SWOBODA, DAS 
RECHT DER PRESSE: HANDBUCH FÜR DIE PRAXIS 64 (1997). 
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formed when (1) the disclosure of a victim’s identity determines an interference 
with his or her “strictly private life” or exposure, and (2) the suspect is a juve-
nile or the publication relates to a lesser indictable offence (Vergehen) or may 
disproportionately prejudice the person’s advancement. Damages sustained on 
account of an unlawful disclosure are recoverable within a maximum award of 
20,000 €. In addition, injunctions may be ordered by the courts on the basis of 
the special statutory rules on right to likeness.137 
To sum up, these legal systems afford the anonymity interest a broad and ar-
ticulated protection. The practice of the news media is notably consistent with 
the law on the books. In Austria and Germany, the press voluntarily refrains 
from publishing names or photographs of defendants until they have been con-
victed. The opposite holds true, however, for high-profile cases or prominent 
defendants.138 In France, on the contrary, courts seem less inclined to guarantee 
the anonymity interest, at least when the publication of the suspect’s name or 
likeness does not threaten the right to respect of presumption of innocence.139 In 
both France and Italy, though, special legislative provisions prohibit the publi-
cation of photographs of persons with handcuffs—and victims of sexual of-
fenses140—without their previous consent.141 
Italian media show no self-restraint in disclosing a suspect’s identity, except-
ing only juvenile defendants. Nonetheless, introduction of the Data Protection 
Act of 1996 may foreshadow the slow modification of such contestable behav-
ior. Indeed, several decisions of the Data Protection Authority have stated that 
the publication of a suspect’s identification photographs is possible without his 
 
 137. Section 78 of Bundesgesetz über das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literatur und der Kunst und 
über verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] [The Copyright Act] BGBl. No. 111/1936 
provides “Images of persons shall neither be exhibited publicly, nor in any way made accessible to the 
public, where injury would be caused to the legitimate interests of the persons concerned or, in the 
event that they have died without having authorised or ordered publication, those of a close relative” 
(translated in News Verlags GmbH & Co., App. No. 31457/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. at [32]). For courts’ option 
to invoke injunctions, see SWOBODA, supra note 136, at 128; Koziol &Warzilek, supra note 134, at 19. 
 138. See BORNKAMM, supra note 20, at 248, 250–51. For some statistics concerning victims’ and de-
fendants’ identity-disclosure rate, see KREISEL, supra note 100, at 136. The right to anonymity is re-
spected in Sweden and in the Netherlands, as well. See Krause, supra note 20, at 551 n.118 (citing The 
Right of Anonymity, 131 NEW L.J. 1121, 1121 (1981) (on Sweden); Scheer, supra note 38, at 38 (1993) 
(on the Netherlands). 
 139. Chambre civil [Cass. civ.] [Civil Chamber], June 20, 2002, JURIS CLASSEUR PÉRIODIQUE [JCP] 
2002, IV, No. 2394, 1594; Cass. civ., July 12, 2001, JCP 2002, II, No. 10152, 1798; Tribunal de grande in-
stance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, July 7, 1993, JCP 1994, II, No. 22306, 313. 
On the issue of identity disclosure and the solution adopted by French case law, see Jacques Ravanas, 
Droit des personnes: la liberté d’information dans les affaires judiciaries en cours, JCP 2002, II, No. 
10152, 1799 (2002); Christophe Bigot, Protection des droits de la personnalité et liberté de l’information, 
RECUEIL DALLOZ, chronique 235, 236 (1998). 
 140. See Art. 39 quinquies French Press Act 1881; C.P. art. 734 (Italy). 
 141. See Art. 92 of the French Law No. 2000-516 of June 15, 2000, which adds to the Press Act 1881 
an Art. 35ter I; Art. 114 (6 bis) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure and Art. 8 of the Italian Press 
Code of Practice applying to journalism and privacy. See also BONETTI, supra note 83, at 185. 
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consent only for reasons of public interest, and namely for investigation and jus-
tice purposes.142 
2. Unfair Legal Reporting and the Presumption of Innocence 
If the press discloses a suspect’s identity, freedom of speech collides with the 
individual’s interests in privacy and anonymity. The publication concerns a fact 
that is true but that the individual wishes to conceal. If the alleged crime is a 
major offense or if the suspect is a public figure, the anonymity interest will be 
trumped by the public’s right to be informed. Even in this framework, though, 
the freedom of the press to report about pending proceedings is not unlimited.143 
Most frequently, media coverage of criminal proceedings affects the sus-
pect’s rights to honor and reputation. To suggest that an individual is guilty of a 
criminal offense constitutes libel in most European jurisdictions.144 However, the 
truth of the allegation is commonly admitted as a valid defense and discharges 
the defendant from liability,145 so no claim for defamation will lie for a person 
depicted in a newspaper article as guilty of a criminal offense who is eventually 
convicted of that offense.146 
 
 142. See, e.g., Data Prot. Auth., Apr. 13, 1999, web doc. no. 39077; Data Prot. Auth., Mar. 19, 2003, 
web doc. no. 1053451; Data Prot. Auth., Nov. 26, 2003, web doc. no. 1053631, all available at 
http://www.garanteprivacy.it (prohibiting the publication of identification photos of persons under ar-
rest); Trib. Milano, 9-11-2004, in PRIVACY E GIORNALISMO 220 (Mauro Paissan ed., 2nd ed. 2006) 
(confirming the Data Protection Authority’s last quoted decision). For some comments on the stance 
taken by the Data Protection Authority, see BONETTI, supra note 83, at 190. 
 143. See, e.g., OLG Brandenburg, Dec. 15, 1995, 48 NJW 885 (F.R.G.) (considering lawful the dis-
closure of a suspect’s identity, but awarding damages for the unfair content of the article). 
 144. In many Continental jurisdictions, defamation is both a crime and a tort. See Alexander War-
zilek, Comparative Report, in THE PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS AGAINST INVASIONS BY 
MASS MEDIA, supra note 132, at 620. 
 145. In many jurisdictions, this principle applies if sufficient research has been carried out and the 
statement is expressed in a formally correct and impartial fashion. The journalist in such a case will not 
be held liable for defamation even if the accused is eventually acquitted and the allegation results 
therefore shown to be untrue. See generally 2 CHRISTIAN VON BAR, THE COMMON EUROPEAN LAW 
OF TORTS 103 (2000) (providing a comparative analysis of the law of reputation in several European 
countries and noting that journalists, as a matter of principle, “are not subject to an obligation de résul-
tat, [that is] if sufficient research has been carried out, they are not liable for an objectively untrue 
statement”). With specific reference to legal reporting, see Müller, supra note 127, at 1618. Particularly 
significant in this respect is the development of English law after the landmark decision of the House of 
Lords in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., (2001) 2 A.C. 127 (expanding significantly the defense of 
qualified privilege in libel suits and identifying a nonexhaustive list of ten factors to be considered in 
evaluating the defamatory nature of a publication); Rogers, The Protection of Personality Rights against 
Invasions by Mass Media in England, in THE PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS AGAINST 
INVASIONS BY MASS MEDIA, supra note 132, at 59, 69 (discussing the impact of Reynolds on the Eng-
lish law of defamation). 
 146. See BORNKAMM, supra note 20, at 252 n.29 (quoting several German decisions that dismissed 
damage claims for the violation of a suspect’s personality right, on the ground that the plaintiff was 
eventually convicted at trial). See also the rule stated by Section 190 of the German Penal Code 
[StGB], concerning the truth defense in defamation proceedings:  
If the asserted or disseminated fact is a crime, then the proof of the truth thereof shall be 
considered to have been provided, if a final judgment of conviction for the act has been 
entered against the person insulted. The proof of the truth is, on the other hand, excluded, if 
the insulted person had been acquitted in a final judgment before the assertion or 
dissemination. 
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Yet reputation is not the only interest that may be infringed by an unfair 
media report. Many legal systems afford specific protection to the presumption 
of innocence. According to Article 6 (2) of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, “everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law.” The deduction that is generally drawn 
from this principle is that at trial the defendant is presumed innocent until guilt 
is proven. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled on several occa-
sions, though, that the presumption of innocence as applied should be even 
more broadly recognized:147 namely, every citizen has the right not to be publicly 
shown as being guilty of a criminal offense before final conviction.148 
Article 6 (2) of the Convention immediately binds only public authorities. 
However, more recently, the principle of presumption of innocence has been 
applied increasingly also to “horizontal” relationships between private parties.149 
This does not imply, obviously, that an individual is entitled to be considered 
innocent by any other citizens. It rather means that when a controversy is 
brought before a court, presumption of innocence should be employed as a 
normative parameter for the solution of the dispute and more generally for the 
interpretation and implementation of private-law provisions (mittelbare Dritt-
wirkung, or indirect effect of fundamental rights).150 This is consistent with the 
doctrine of “positive obligations” of the state, developed by the European 
Court of Human Rights and employed by several national courts as well.151 
In this perspective, German law has been pathbreaking. German courts 
started as early as the 1980s to widen the protection afforded by the general 
 
(English translation available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm#190). 
 147. See Allenet de Ribemont v. France, App. No. 15175/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 10, 1995), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C116
6DEA398649&key=61929&sessionId=14267304&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true; Y.B. v. Turkey, 
App. Nos. 48173/99, 48319/99 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 28, 2005), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/ 
viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=9404&sessionI
d=14267541&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. 
 148. See, e.g., Badinter, supra note 44, at 133, 145 (2001); Kristian Kühl, Persönlichkeitsschutz des 
Tatverdächtigen durch die Unschuldsvermutung, in BEITRÄGE ZUM SCHUTZ DER PERSÖNLICHKEIT 
UND IHRER SCHÖPFERISCHEN LEISTUNGEN: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HEINRICH HUBMANN ZUM 70, 
GEBURTSTAG, at 241, 246–47 (Hans Forkel & Alfons Kraft eds., 1985) (F.R.G.). 
 149. See PETER SZCZEKALLA, DIE SOGENANNTEN GRUNDRECHTLICHEN SCHUTZPFLICHTEN IM 
DEUTSCHEN UND EUROPÄISCHEN RECHT 780–82 (2002) (F.R.G.); Badinter, supra note 44, at 145–46; 
Christoph Grabenwarter, Justiz- und Verfahrensgrundrechte, in EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTE UND 
GRUNDFREIHEITEN 126, 138–39 (Dirk Ehlers ed., 2003) (F.R.G.). 
 150. See BORNKAMM, supra note 20, at 254–55; Bornkamm, supra note 116, at 104–05; KLAUS 
WASSERBURG, DER SCHUTZ DER PERSÖNLICHKEIT IM RECHT DER MEDIEN 179 (1988) (F.R.G.); 
Kühl, supra note 148, at 248–52; Karlheinz Meyer, Grenzen der Unschuldsvermutung, in FESTSCHRIFT 
FÜR HERBERT TRÖNDLE ZUM 70, GEBURTSTAG 61, 63 (Hans-Heinrich Jescheck & Theo Vogler eds., 
1989) (F.R.G.); Riklin & Höpfel, supra note 116, at 53–55. 
 151. On the doctrine of positive obligations (or Schutzpflichten), see ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN 
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 349 (2006); STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 215 (2006); Frédéric 
Sudre, Les ‘obligations positives’ dans la jurisprudence européenne des droits de l’homme, in 
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1359, 1361 (Paul Mahoney et al. eds., 
2000). On the problems of state action and Drittwirkung in comparative perspective, see also VICKI C. 
JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1413, 1414 (1999). 
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clauses on personality rights in order to encompass a right to respect of pre-
sumption of innocence.152 For instance, in one renowned case, a media company 
was held liable for damages for having published an article in which a senior 
immigration officer, charged with the offense of having granted residence per-
mits to a group of Syrian terrorists in exchange for money, was depicted as 
guilty. The court stressed that the presumption of innocence is a constitutive 
element of the general right of the personality153 and is violated if a person is 
openly treated as guilty of a criminal offense before guilt is proved according to 
law. Injunctive relief and damages are available to the plaintiff, and the defen-
dant is not discharged from liability by tendering evidence of the truth of the al-
legation.154 
This solution has been criticized on occasions by some scholars who fear its 
chilling effect on freedom of speech.155 Indeed, the German Supreme Court has 
underlined the necessity of balancing the presumption of innocence with free-
dom of expression and has singled out articulated criteria that should guarantee 
the fairness of the reporting.156 However, the idea that the presumption of inno-
cence should be employed as a normative parameter in order to achieve an af-
fordable balance between the free press and an individual’s personality rights 
has gained wider acceptance.157 Significantly, even the Press Code of 2001 has 
openly recognized a press duty to respect the presumption of innocence, stating 
that “[r]eports on investigations, criminal court proceedings and other formal 
procedures must be free from prejudice. The principle of the presumption of 
innocence also applies to the Press.”158 
France and Austria have taken a similar stance. In 1993 the French Civil 
Code was amended to strengthen the protection afforded to the presumption of 
 
 152. See, e.g., OLG Köln June 2, 1987, 40 NJW 2682 (2684) (according injunctive relief and damages 
for the violation of presumption of innocence by the press); OLG Frankfurt Sept. 6, 1979, 33 NJW 597 
(admitting an indirect third-party effect of the European Convention of Human Rights, but stressing 
the necessity of a balance of the conflicting interests). 
 153. On the dogmatic distinction between general and special personality rights see VON BAR, supra 
note 145, at 93. 
 154. OLG Köln June 2, 1987, 40 NJW 2682 (2684). 
 155. For an example of recent criticism, see Weigend, supra note 73, at 46–47. 
 156. BGH Dec. 7, 1999, 53 NJW 1036 (identifying a nonexhaustive list of factors to be used in de-
termining whether a media report has infringed personality rights of the suspect plaintiff (among these 
factors are: seriousness of the allegation; evidence supporting the statements; prohibition of anticipa-
tory statements of guilt (Vorverurteilung); impartiality; tone of the article; nature of the information 
and the extent to which the subject matter is a matter of public concern)). For a detailed analysis of 
these criteria, see Müller, supra note 127, at 1617–18; Erich Steffen, Sub § 6 LPG, in PRESSERECHT: 
KOMMENTAR ZU DEN DEUTSCHEN LANDESPRESSEGESETZEN 381–86 (2006). 
 157. See BORNKAMM, supra note 20, at 266; CARL-FRIEDRICH STUCKENBERG, UNTERSUCHUNGEN 
ZUR UNSCHULDSVERMUTUNG 147 (1998); Hassemer, supra note 13, at 1923; Kühl, supra note 148, at 
250; Meyer, supra note 150, at 63; Soehring, supra note 127, at 522; Riklin & Frank, supra note 116, at 
53–55. 
 158. See GERMAN PRESS CODE § 13 (German Press Council 2006). Guideline n. 13.1, second sen-
tence, attached to Section 13, provides: “In a state based on the rule of law, the aim of court reporting 
must not be to punish convicted criminals socially as well by using the media as a ‘pillory.’ Reports 
should make a clear distinction between suspicion and proven guilt.” On the legal value and the en-
forcement mechanism of the Press Code, see MÜNCH, supra note 132, at 161, 230. 
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innocence by the Criminal Procedure Code and by the general rules on person-
ality rights.159 As a consequence, Article 9-1 was introduced in the Civil Code 
and later modified by the law 2000-516.160 The text now in force reads as follows: 
Everyone has the right to respect of the presumption of innocence. Where, before any 
sentence, a person is publicly shown as being guilty of facts under enquiries or pre-
liminary investigation, the court, even by interim order and without prejudice to com-
pensation for injury suffered, may prescribe any measures, such as the insertion of a 
rectification or the circulation of a communiqué, in order to put an end to the in-
fringement of the presumption of innocence, at the expenses of the natural or juridical 
person liable for that infringement.161 
This provision not only creates a new droit subjectif that enriches and up-
dates the traditional catalogue of personality rights;162 it also provides for a set of 
remedies, which may be enforced also through interim measures and are there-
fore more effective. In addition to damages, the plaintiff has been granted a 
right to rectification and insertion of a communiqué.163 These remedies are 
autonomous from the ordinary defamation proceedings.164 The values served by 
the new statutory device are also different: What is at stake is not simply the 
personal reputation, but the interest not to be named guilty of an offense before 
final conviction and without the guarantees surrounding any criminal proceed-
ings. Accordingly, whereas the truth defense is commonly available in defama-
tion proceedings, it is not under Article 9-1 of the Civil Code.165 
Such a regulation greatly interferes with freedom of the press, and the un-
derlying policy might appear questionable to many observers. However, it is in-
tended to transpose into domestic law Article 6 (2) of the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights and is perfectly coherent with the doctrine of the state’s 
positive obligation to take action to protect the presumption of innocence from 
interference by nonstate actors.166 
In 1995, in light of the same findings, the Austrian Constitutional Court 
dismissed the complaints lodged by several publishers against Section 7b of the 
 
 159. See JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 1/LES PERSONNES 157–58 (2000); DIANE DE 
BELLESCIZE & LAURENCE FRANCESCHINI, DROIT DE LA COMMUNICATION 412–13 (2005); Patrick 
Auvret, Le droit au respect de la présomption d’innocence, JCP 1994, I, No. 3802, 497 (1994); Emmanuel 
Derieux, Limites de la liberté d’expression (Protection de la vie privée et de la présomption d’innocence), 
392 LES PETITES AFFICHES 8 (2003); Jacques-Henri Robert, La protection de la présomption 
d’innocence selon la loi du 4 janvier 1993, in LIBERTÉ DE LA PRESSE ET DROIT PÉNAL 105 (Association 
française de droit pénal ed., 1994); Jacques-Henri Robert, Sub Art. 9-1, in JURIS CLASSEUR CIVIL 1 
(2001) [hereinafter Sub Art. 9-1]. 
 160. See Law No. 93-1013 of Aug. 24, 1993, art. 44; Law No. 2000-516 of June 15, 2000, art. 91. 
 161. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 9-1, English translation available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
html/codes_traduits/code_civil_somA.htm. 
 162. See CARBONNIER, supra note 159, at 157; Auvret, supra note 159, at 499. 
 163. According to some scholars, a right to the sequestration of the material unlawfully published 
should be recognized, since Art. 9-1 refers to “any measure” capable of ending the infringement of the 
presumption of innocence. See Sub Art. 9-1, supra note 159, at 12. 
 164. See Auvret, supra note 159, at 498; Mayer, supra note 87, at 81. 
 165. See Karine Anterion & Olivier Moréteau, The Protection of Personality Rights against Inva-
sions by Mass Media in France, in THE PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS AGAINST INVASIONS 
BY MASS MEDIA, supra note 132, at 117, 129. 
 166. See Auvret, supra note 159, at 498. 
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Austrian Media Act.167 Such a provision protects the presumption of innocence 
against infringements by the media. It reads as follows: 
(1) If in any media a person suspected of having committed an offence punishable by 
the courts but not yet finally convicted, is presented as having already been found 
guilty or as author of such punishable offence and not only as suspect, the person af-
fected is entitled to claim indemnity from the media owner for the injury suffered. The 
indemnity must not exceed 20,000 €, in addition § 6 second sentence shall be applied. 
(2) No claims under para. 1 may be raised[:]  
 1. in cases of a true report on a hearing in a public session of the National Council, 
the Federal Council, the Federal Assembly, a Länder Parliament or any committee of 
the above general bodies of representation,  
 2. if it concerns a true report on a penal sentence in first instance and includes the 
mention that the sentence is not final,  
 3. if the person affected has admitted and not withdrawn a statement made in public 
or to media representatives, of having committed the offence,  
 4. if it was a live broadcast and employees or agents of the broadcaster were not 
guilty of neglecting the journalistic diligence required,  
 4a. if it concerns the availability for download of a website, provided that the media 
owner or one of his employees or agents has not failed to use due care, or  
 5. if it is a case of a true quotation of the statement of a third party and the public 
had a predominant interest in obtaining knowledge of the statement quoted.168 
Whereas the French courts have been quite cautious in applying Article 9-1 
of the Civil Code, attempting to avoid any unnecessary restriction on the free-
dom of the press,169 in Austria the commitment to protect the presumption of 
innocence has been taken more seriously. Several claims that probably would 
not have reached the threshold of defamation actions have been upheld under 
the heading of Section 7b.170 For instance, making reference to a conviction for 
the unlawful processing of personal data without mentioning that an appeal is 
pending has been held to violate Article 7b of the Media Act and so gives rise 
to an action for damages.171 The same holds true if the press gives the mere im-
 
 167. Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [constitutional court], Sept. 28, 1995, G 249/94, in 51 
ÖSTERREICHISCHE JURISTEN ZEITUNG [ÖJZ] 591 (592). For a comment, see SZCZEKALLA, supra 
note 149, at 780. 
 168. MedG BGB1. No. 314/1981 (English translation available at http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/erv/erv_ 
1981_314.pdf). On this provision and the previous regulations, see SWOBODA, supra note 136, at 73. 
 169. French courts have often made clear that a simple bias against the defendant does not infringe 
the presumption of innocence; in order to succeed, the plaintiff has to prove that the media have pre-
sented him as certainly guilty before a final conviction. See Cass. civ., July 12, 2001, JCP 2002, II, No. 
10152, 1798. On the restrictive stance taken by the French case law as regards C. CIV. art. 9-1, see 
PHILIPPE MALAURIE & LAURENT AYNÈS, LES PERSONNES, LES INCAPACITÉS 112 (2003); Ravanas, 
supra note 139, at 1800. 
 170. For a detailed overview of the Austrian case law, see BRANDSTETTER & SCHMID, supra note 
64, at 95–104; LITZKA, supra note 65, at 64–71. 
 171. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [supreme court], Jan. 29, 2004, docket no. 6 Ob 306/03y, 
http://www.ris2.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Justiz/JJT_20040129_OGH0002_0060OB00306_03Y0000_000/JJ
T_20040129_OGH0002_0060OB00306_03Y0000_000.pdf. 
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pression that a person convicted for some specific offense is also responsible for 
other crimes that have not yet been prosecuted.172 
Injunctions have also been granted against the publication of the photo-
graphs of individuals suspected of major crimes or lesser indictable offences, on 
the basis of the special provisions on the right to likeness.173 This solution may 
be incompatible with the freedom-of-expression provision in Article 10 of the 




Much ink has been spilled on both sides of the Atlantic about the values 
served by an unrestrained exercise of freedom of the press. However, critics 
have pointed out that, in the realities of modern society, the dissemination of 
the news is part of an industrial process, which is commonly driven by business 
concerns and which should be regulated like any other commercial activity.175 
The attitudes toward media freedom to cover and report judicial proceed-
ings are similarly ambivalent. On the one hand, it is celebrated as a “hand-
maiden of effective judicial administration . . . [since the press] does not simply 
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by 
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public 
scrutiny and criticism.”176 On the other, it is increasingly depicted as a profitable 
 
 172. OGH, Mar. 14, 2000, docket no. 4 Ob 11/00x, http://www.ris2.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Justiz/JJT_ 
20000314_OGH0002_0040OB00011_00X0000_000/JJT_20000314_OGH0002_0040OB00011_00X0000_
000.pdf. 
 173. See UrhG [The Copyright Act] BGBl. No. 111/1936, § 78. 
 174. The most recent authority on this subject is Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria (No.2), App. 
No. 10520/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 14, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm. 
asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=59899&sessionId=142679
36&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. This case involved a publisher’s complaint about an injunction 
ordered by the Austrian Supreme Court against the publication of a business magnate’s photograph in 
connection with an article reporting charges of tax evasion. The European Court of Human Rights held 
that the prior restraint on the press breached Article 10 because the contested ban on publication was 
absolute and therefore “excluded any weighing of interests between the public interest to have the in-
formation on the proceedings for tax evasion pending against Mr[.] G. accompanied by his picture 
against the latter’s interest to have his identity protected.” Id. at [40]. In particular, the Austrian Su-
preme Court was reproached for having overlooked that the person under investigation was a public 
figure and the article reported on a matter of public interest. For a similar case, see also News Verlags 
GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria, App. No. 31457/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 11, 2000), http://cmiskp.echr.coe. 
int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=11
68&sessionId=14267936&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true, and the comment on this decision by Eva 
Brems, Conflicting Human Rights: An Exploration in the Context of the Right to a Fair Trial in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 27 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 294, 313 (2005). 
 175. See Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, Media Liability in the Information Society, in THE 
PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS AGAINST INVASIONS BY MASS MEDIA, supra note 132, at 539, 
543. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. 
REV. 384 (1974). 
 176. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). 
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playground of a commercially motivated media industry that “capitalize[s] on 
the public’s apparently insatiable appetite for all things sensational.”177 
These two perspectives are not necessarily incompatible. It is the task of the 
law to prevent a socially valuable activity—such as informing the public about 
the workings of the justice process—from being transformed by market pres-
sures into a “power without responsibility.”178 The techniques available vary 
widely in intensity and character, and it should be clear that no “optimal” mix 
of preventive, repressive, or neutralizing measures can be singled out as a con-
ceptual exercise.179 Experience teaches us that solutions to legal problems are 
less the results of rational planning than the byproducts of a complex web of 
historical, cultural, and social factors. 
This article has contrasted three models for the regulation of court-related 
speech: the American neutralizing approach, the English protective model, and 
the Continental preventive stance. Different from the Anglo American ap-
proach and consistent with the nonadversarial model of criminal procedure, 
civil-law systems seem to be relatively less concerned with the impact of media 
freedom to report and cover judicial proceedings on trial fairness. By contrast, 
civil-law systems pay greater attention to safeguard the dignitarian and reputa-
tional interests of trial participants. Most of the techniques adopted and de-
scribed here—general penal sanctions, private-law remedies, professional rules 
of conduct—are, at their core, aimed at preventing an uncontrolled imposition 
of ancillary reputational sanctions by the court of public opinion. The recent 
trend toward the extension of the presumption of innocence to the “horizontal” 
relationships between the defendant and the media clearly mirrors such an atti-
tude. 
It might be argued that this model reflects a strong individualistic position 
and undervalues the watchdog function of the press, making a transatlantic dia-
logue impossible. But one should always be skeptical of absolute generaliza-
tions about legal systems. Model-building in comparative law is always a study 
of relative differences.180 To assume that the American model is not concerned 
with privacy and dignity while the Continental approach always sacrifices free 
press in the name of a suspect’s personality right would be nonsensical, though 
European systems are more inclined than the United States to accept interfer-
ence with freedom of expression aimed at protecting the fairness of trials (Eng-
lish law) or dignitarian interests (Continental law), or both. 
Moreover, it would be a mistake not to pay attention to the dynamic dimen-
sion of the law. Every taxonomy should be flexible enough to take into account 
the evolution and change of legal systems. The phenomenon of the constitu-
 
 177. Geragos, supra note 4, at 1168. 
 178. Recalling the title of the famous book by JAMES CURRAN & JEAN SEATON, POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE PRESS AND BROADCASTING IN BRITAIN (2003). 
 179. See FENWICK & PHILLIPSON, supra note 24, at 179–80 (arguing that, in practice, “[n]o state re-
lies exclusively on one model”). 
 180. See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 41, at 1163. 
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tionalization of speech claims has at least partly shortened the distance between 
U.S. legal experience and common-law experiences in other countries.181 Simi-
larly, the most recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights shows 
an increasing concern for safeguarding the watchdog function of the press, es-
pecially when political speech is at stake. In an important line of authorities, 
from News Verlags GmbH v. Austria182 to Dupuis v. France,183 the European 
Court of Human Rights has applied the principle of proportionality in order to 
prevent member states from imposing overreaching restrictions on the media, 
even if those restrictions are justified by the need to protect the privacy of trial 
participants or the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.184 As a conse-
quence, a process of gradual convergence also seems to be on the way from this 
side. 
Undeniably, finding an acceptable balance among free press, fair trials, and 
the personality interests of trial participants is a difficult task in every legal sys-
tem. It involves not merely technical issues, but value choices of the greatest 
relevance to any society. Comparative law cannot (and probably should not) 
tell us what the best solution is. However, it might enormously help us to render 
 
 181. See supra II.B. 
 182. App. No. 31457/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 11, 2000), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/ 
viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=1168&sessionI
d=14267936&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. Here the European Court of Human Rights had to de-
cide whether an injunction prohibiting the publication of the photograph of a right-wing extremist ar-
rested on suspicion of being involved with a series of letter-bombs as part of a political campaign in-
fringed Article 10 of the Convention. The Court conceded that the injunctions pursued legitimate aims, 
since they were intended to protect reputation and presumption of innocence. However, it found that 
the “absolute prohibition on the publication of B.’s picture went further than was necessary to protect 
B. against defamation or against violation of the presumption of innocence.” Id. at [59]. Great weight 
was attached to the fact that the proposed publication concerned a matter of major public concern; that 
the instances of conduct reported upon were “offences with a political background directed against the 
foundations of a democratic society,” and that the defendant “being a right-wing extremist, . . . had en-
tered the public scene well before the series of letter-bomb attacks.” Id. at [54]. 
 183. App. No. 1914/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 12, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/ 
viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=62703&session
Id=14267304&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. This case is particularly significant. An application 
was lodged before the European Court by some journalists, sentenced in France to a fine and con-
demned to damages for having profited on information obtained in breach of professional and pretrial 
secrecy. In 1996 they published a book, entitled Les Oreilles du Président, concerning the scandal of 
illegal wire-tappings carried out by an antiterrorism unit created by President Mitterand. At that time, a 
senior official of Mitterand’s entourage was under investigation for the offences of unlawful wire-
tapping and infringement of privacy of many French citizens. Documents excerpted from the pretrial 
dossier, like transcripts of the intercepted communications and other items of evidence, were published 
in this book. The European Court of Human Rights held that France breached Article 10 of the Con-
vention. The interference with freedom of the press pursued legitimate aims, but was not “necessary in 
a democratic society.” Indeed, the European Court stressed that it was not proportionate to the aims 
pursued to prosecute the journalists for the crime of “receiving” since the publication focused on topics 
that resulted in the utmost public concern. The wire-tapping scandal was a state affair and the person 
under investigation was a prominent politician. Consequently, a higher degree of transparency had to 
be accepted as instrumental to the needs of a democratic society. 
 184. For a detailed overview, see FENWICK & PHILLIPSON, supra note 24, at 180–94; Brems, supra 
note 174, at 311–16; Mario Chiavario, I rapporti giustizia-‘media’ nella giurisprudenza della Corte euro-
pea dei diritti dell’uomo, 123 Foro It. V 209 (2000); CRAM, supra note 20, at 66–75. 
03__RESTA__CONTRACT PROOF.DOC 11/18/2008  11:38:48 AM 
66 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:31 
such value choices much more transparent and to therefore better understand 
them. 
 
